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 Common Sense or Commonwealth?
 The Fence Law and Institutional
 Change in the Postbellum South
 By SHAwN EvERErr KANTOR andJ. MORGAN KoussER
 RARELY HAVE SOUTHERN HISTORIANS DEVOTED AS MUCH ATTENTION TO A SIMPLE
 question of torts as they have in the instance of fence laws: would owners of
 livestock be held liable for damages to other people's crops if they did not
 fence in their animals (referred to as the "stock law"), or did crop owners
 have to fence out other people's cattle and swine (known as the "fence
 law")? In most of the sparsely settled pre-Civil War South, the open-range,
 or fence-law, position prevailed. Post-Civil War state legislation allowed
 voters in counties or subcounty districts to adopt laws that shifted rights to
 crop growers and town dwellers and away from owners of livestock, which
 effectively closed the range.1
 Debates over this question, Steven Hahn contends in his sweeping
 reinterpretation of postbellum southern society and politics, reflected
 See, e.g., Georgia Acts ... Adjourned Session, 1872, No.329, pp. 34-36. In 1881 militia
 districts were permitted to hold fence elections. See Georgia Acts ... 1880-81, No. 401,
 pp. 79-81. In the early postbellum period the Alabama and Mississippi state legislatures
 passed county-specific acts either allowing county or subcounty referenda or permitting
 landowners to petition county officials to enact the stock law. In South Carolina and in
 some counties and militia districts in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, however, the
 stock law was imposed in the late nineteenth century by the state legislature without
 referenda or petition. See South Carolina Acts. . . 1881-82, No. 472, pp. 591-94, and
 amended, No. 603, p. 854. The Mississippi and Alabama legislatures authorized referenda
 in all counties and subcounty districts in 1892 and 1903, respectively. See Mississippi
 Acts. . . 1892, Chap. 71, pp. 161-66; Alabama Acts ... 1903, No. 31 1, pp. 431-38. We wish
 to thank Lance Davis andJean-Laurent Rosenthal for helpful discussions during our work
 on this paper and Doug Flamming and David Weiman for extraordinarily helpful
 comments on previous versions of this paper. Naturally, we retain strict property rights
 to any of the paper's remaining shortcomings.
 MR. KANTOR is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Arizona
 and faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
 MR. KoussER is a professor of history and social science at the California Institute
 of Technology.
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 struggles between an "agrarian bourgeoisie," on the one hand, and those
 who believed in "a cooperative principle that challenged the tenets of
 bourgeois individualism and property, that challenged the hegemony of the
 marketplace," on the other.2 This was not simply a clash between people or
 classes with different economic interests, Hahn believes, but a full-blown
 culturaVideological struggle:
 What underlay contention over the material consequences of the stock law
 were considerably different, and increasingly antagonistic, ideas about social
 relations and property rights. The freedom to which [stock-law opponents]
 adhered was not merely that founded upon ownership of one's person and
 exchange in the marketplace, but that founded upon control over productive
 resources, labor time, and subsistence which, in turn, could be realized only
 through membership in the commonwealth of producers. The stock-law
 controversy set the republicanism of those producers against the values of the
 free market.3
 To its critics, according to Hahn, the stock law "was the starkest instance of
 efforts by the emerging postbellum elite to cast petty producers into a state
 of dependency." Central to Hahn's larger interpretation of the transforma-
 tion of the nineteenth-century upcountry, the fence-law contests, in his
 words, "paved the road to Populism."4 Actually devoting little direct
 attention to Populism itself, Hahn concentrates on two small counties in the
 Georgia hills, Carroll and Jackson.
 In this article, we revisit the battles that Hahn addresses, evaluating his
 and others' hypotheses about fence-law conflicts within the two counties in
 his study. In addition to reexamining the published debate between propo-
 nents and opponents of this livestock-enclosure movement, we explicitly
 and rigorously test Hahn's and others' explanations by formulating com-
 peting models and assessing them with multivariate statistical methods. We
 find more subtlety and complexity in the debate and the clashes of interest
 than they appear to have in Hahn's presentation. While we do not doubt
 that differences over policy stances and ideology often move people to
 action, we do believe that the importance of such factors must be weighed
 against the evidence in each particular case, rather than automatically
 assumed to be determinative.5 In this instance, we show that it is possible to
 2 Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the
 Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York and Oxford, 1983), 239-53 (quotations on pp.
 244 and 252).
 3 Ibid., 250, 253-54. [Editor's note: see Steven Hahn, "Common Cents or Historical
 Sense?" p. 245, and Shawn Everett Kantor and J. Morgan Kousser, "Two Visions of
 History," p. 259, note 2, both in this issue, for discussions of this quotation.]
 4 Ibid., 239, 240.
 5 Douglass C. North, Structure and Chance in Economic History (New York and London,
 1981) warns economic historians against arbitrarily assuming "rational" self-interest on
 the part of individuals. North shows that ideological beliefs must be equally considered
 as motivating factors in economic or political change. In other work, Kousser emphasizes
 the importance of ideology. See "'The Supremacy of Equal Rights': The Struggle Against
 Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Four-
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 choose between different explanations of motivation, and we argue that the
 conflict was over material, not cultural, matters.
 Hahn is not the first to study southern fence laws-not even the first to
 focus on Carroll County. The late James C. Bonner viewed the debate
 mainly as a conflict between "small farmers in isolated areas and those
 living in more densely populated areas."6 The pre-Civil War southern
 economy had been almost wholly agricultural. After 1865, periodic depres-
 sions, as well as the geographically uneven development of railroads,
 towns, and industries, created a "rural-urban schism" that was manifest in
 the local debate over the fence issue. The Populists' relative success in
 Carroll County in the 1890s, according to Bonner, was the climactic result
 of the developing class conflicts in the local battles to close the open range.7
 Proposing many of the core ideas later generalized to the entire South and
 expressed more vividly by Hahn, Bonner's 1971 monograph attracted
 much less response than Hahn's 1983 work.
 Charles L. Flynn, Jr., also highlights the fence-law debate, which he
 refers to as "the bitterest political issue in Georgia politics between Re-
 demption and the Populist Revolt of the 1890s."8 But instead of a symbolic
 cultural battle, Flynn sees the contest as a purely material class conflict
 pitting relatively affluent landowning whites against the landless or land-
 poor, white as well as black. Although he admits the validity of some of the
 arguments of the stock-law proponents, Flynn judges partisans of that
 position "at least indifferent to the burdens that the change placed upon the
 poor."9 Spreading from the more populated, less forested black belt to the
 developing hill country, the dispute shifted from a contest predominantly
 between blacks and whites to one primarily between different classes of
 whites. "The fence-law controversy," Flynn contends, "illustrated the inter-
 secting class and racial division in the life of the New South." While
 stock-law advocates wanted to minimize the expense of fencing and the
 property damage caused by marauding animals, fence-law advocates feared
 high charges by landlords and large farmers for the penned, watered
 grazing space that would be necessary if the fence law were repealed.'0
 In a geographically broader review of two centuries of southern grazing
 laws, J. Crawford King, Jr., details the gradual closing of the southern
 range."I Rather than analyzing each side's stated rationale for acting, King
 teenth Amendment," Northwestern University Law Review, LXXXII (Summer 1988), 941-
 1010.
 6James C. Bonner, Georgia 's Last Frontier: The Development of Carroll County (Athens,
 Ga., 1971), 143.
 7Ibid., 139.
 8 Charles L. Flynn, Jr., White Land, Black Labor: Caste and Class in Late Nineteenth-
 Century Georgia (Baton Rouge and London, 1983), 128.
 9Ibid., 131.
 '0Ibid., Chap. 5 (quotation on p. 129).
 "1 J. Crawford King,Jr., "The Closing of the Southern Range: An Exploratory Study,"
 Journal of Southern History, XLIII (February 1982), 53-70.
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 divides the counties of Alabama and Mississippi into those that had either
 partially or completely adopted the stock law by 1890 and those in which
 the open range persisted. Using 1880 census data, he then compares several
 of the objective traits of the two groups of counties: population density,
 racial proportions, fann-tenure arrangements and size, intensity of cultiva-
 tion and concentration on cotton, and number of livestock (especially hogs)
 per person. Failing to employ any multivariate methods or explicit statisti-
 cal models, King presents only a series of contrasts between the mean
 values of each variable in the two sets of counties. Although he concludes
 that his results "suggest a much more complex interpretation than the
 simplistic and somewhat artificial picture of battle between 'haves' and
 'have-nots'," King does not flesh out such an interpretation himself.'2
 Historians are not the only scholars to notice fence laws. In a now classic
 1960 paper, the economist Ronald H. Coase employs the example of a
 dispute between a farmer and a cattle raiser over who should compensate
 the other for the damage caused by livestock in the absence of a fence
 between their adjacent properties. 13 In certain circumstances, Coase argues,
 the individuals would voluntarily come to an agreement that would maxi-
 mize the value of what the two of them produced, regardless of who
 initially owned the grazing rights. A cooperative Coasian solution might
 not take place, however, if there were too many potential parties to the
 agreement. More bargainers would multiply the difficulty of gaining infor-
 mation about each individual's true preferences and behavior and therefore
 complicate the negotiation and enforcement of any contract.'4 The same
 difficulties that would undermine a free-market solution would have a
 similar effect on a voluntary communitarian arrangement, unless every
 person in the community were altruistic, since non-altruists would have
 strong incentives to take advantage of their fellows' generosity.'
 This probable contractual breakdown can be particularly disastrous in
 what natural resource economists refer to as "common pool" situations. 16 If
 12 Ibid., 63-70 (quotation on p. 68).
 13 Ronald H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, III
 (October 1960), 1-44.
 14 Economists refer to such difficulties as "transaction costs," which include the costs
 of bargaining, information, supervision, enforcement, measurement, and political ac-
 tion. One of Coase's crucial assumptions, and, implicitly, one of Hahn's (see Roots of
 Southern Populism, 252-53, on "the abiding logic of the open range"), is that transaction
 costs are negligible. See Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, "The Coase Theo-
 rem: Some Experimental Tests,"Journal of Law and Economics, XXV (April 1982), 73 for
 an exhaustive list of Coase's assumptions. It is instructive that the arch-laissez-faire
 theorist and the radical historian share the zero-transaction-costs assumption.
 15 It is surprising that Coase and Hahn should emphasize the voluntary and/or
 communitarian aspects of the fence-law structure, for the traditional historical view is that
 requiring crops, rather than animals, to be fenced often fostered bitter, incessant
 conflicts. See, e.g., Earl W. Hayter, "Livestock-Fencing Conflicts in Rural America,"
 Agricultural History, XXXVII (January 1963), 10-20.
 16 H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The
 Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, LXII (April 1954), 124-42.
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 fishermen do not consider the effect of their current actions on the welfare
 of others or themselves in the future, they may quickly deplete the resource.
 As long as the pond is overstocked, no human suffers. But if the supply of
 fish falls below a certain point, then every fish caught by one person is a
 meal denied to another. If the supply declines to a point below the replace-
 ment level, every fish taken hurts not only individuals other than the one
 fishing, but the society as a whole. Similarly, under the fence law, the
 owners of grazing animals could let them run free on other peoples' land.
 This law therefore encouraged stock raisers to increase the size of their
 herds beyond the size they would have maintained if they had to confine
 and feed the animals on their own property. Conversely, landowners in
 such a situation would tend to underinvest in improvements other than
 fences, lawyers' fees, and buckshot.'7 Where there is plenty of forest or
 scrub land, free grazing may damage society less than the cost of enclosing
 the animals. But as the supply of forests, nuts, and grasses decreases, more
 and more farners-renters and sharecroppers, as well as landowners-will
 suffer losses from roaming animals; and future generations will be robbed
 to allow for the rapid exploitation of resources in the present.
 Since every farmer under an open-range regime has an economic incen-
 tive to transfer his own cost of raising livestock onto others, private
 contracts in this setting are difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate and
 enforce when there are many farmers. Such a situation inevitably creates a
 demand for government intervention; but because the strength of the
 competing groups varies, the government's ultimate decision is likely to be
 influenced by the power of each individual group."8 The final allocation of
 property rights dictated by the government, therefore, may not conform to
 the one that maximizes "social welfare" and offers no guarantee that the
 outcome would be equitable to any person or group.
 According to Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North, people will seek a
 change in the institutional status quo when the net present value of a new
 regime of property rights exceeds the net present value of the traditional set
 of rights.19 As the costs and benefits are continuously changing under each
 17 Stock-law advocates often charged that the status quo led to too many lawsuits. See,
 e.g., Carrollton (Ga.) Carroll County Times, January 10, 1873; Carrollton (Ga.) Carroll Free
 Press, May 8 andJune 5, 1885;Jefferson (Ga.)Jackson Herald, April 15, 1881, August 24,
 1883, and August 2, 1885.
 18 See for example George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell
 Journal of Economics and Management Science, II (Spring 1971), 3-21; Sam Peltzman,
 "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, XIX
 (August 1976), 211-48; and Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
 Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XCVIII (August 1983),
 371-400.
 19 Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North, Institutional Change and American Economic
 Growth (Cambridge, Eng., 1971), 3-79. See also Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of
 Property Rights," American Economic Review, LVII, No. 2: Papers and Proceedings of the
 Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May 1967), 347-59. For
 an overview of research in economic history on related questions of the political economy
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 institutional structure, the net present value calculation will become a
 dynamic process that individuals and groups constantly update. Examples
 of changes that might have encouraged groups in upcountry Georgia to
 reassess the costs and benefits of keeping the fence law include technologi-
 cal advances in agriculture and animal husbandry, improved transportation,
 changes in population density, increases in cultivated acreage, and changes
 in the relative prices of certain commodities, such as timber, labor, animals,
 animal products, and agricultural produce.
 While the inhabitants of the nineteenth-century Georgia upcountry were
 unaware of neoclassical economic theory, many of their arguments in the
 fence-law debate resemble those of modem economists. Like recent theo-
 rists of property tights and institutional change, nineteenth-century Georgians
 discussed prospective gains in farming efficiency and resource conserva-
 tion. There was widespread agreement that the decision turned on the
 availability of timber for fences, the density of population, and the degrees
 of concentration on growing crops and raising stock Since, unlike econo-
 mists, the practical disputants were seeking to fonn majority coalitions in
 referenda, there was also considerable discussion of who might be expected
 to gain or lose if the institutional structure changed. By far the most
 common abstract or ideological appeal during the debate stressed the
 inconsistency of the fence law with private property rights-an indication
 that stock-law proponents believed that the citizens of the upcountry shared
 a belief in the moral correctness of private property tights. By contrast,
 invocations of traditional rights, which Hahn equates with "preindustrial
 republicanism," were a quite minor part of extant records of the debate over
 fence laws in Carroll and Jackson Counties; even those who referred to
 such rights treated them as exceptional and temporary constraints on a more
 general system of private property.20 Rather than an ideological conflict
 over abstract principles, the debate was largely a hard-headed clash of
 interests waged by pragmatic agriculturalists. "We know," said stock-law
 supporter S. B. Orr of Carroll County, "that people will vote for what they
 suppose to be personal interest in this matter."'21
 Georgia law from colonial times until after the Civil War essentially
 of institutions, see Gary D. Libecap, "Property Rights in Economic History: Implications
 for Research," Explorations in Economic Histoty, XXIII (July 1986), 227-52.
 20 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 253. In an examination of much more recent
 conflicts over fence laws in Shasta County, California, Robert C. Ellickson emphasizes that
 most were settled by "norms of neighborliness," rather than by resorting to the law. In
 difficult cases, he notes, these informal methods included rhetorical backbiting and
 threatened or actual violence against intruding animals. Nevertheless, his interviews
 showed an almost universal belief that "an owner of livestock is responsible for the acts
 of his animals." In other words, they believed in what Hahn terms "absolute private
 property." See Ellickson, "Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
 Shasta County," Stanford Law Review, XXXVIII (February 1986), 623-87 (quotations in
 footnote 20 are on p. 673).
 21 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 22, 1885.
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 held that unfenced land could be used as common pasture.22 This was not an
 English or "Celtic" inheritance, for in the densely populated British Isles,
 common law did not force property owners to fence in their crops.23 Rather,
 owners of animals were required to keep their stock on their own property,
 and stray animals on a neighbor's enclosed or unenclosed land were
 considered trespassers. Vast unimproved land and sparse settlements in
 America, however, made it economical to allow animals to roam the
 countryside freely. Eventually, landowners were compelled either to erect
 and maintain "lawful" fences or to forgo legal claims to compensation for
 damages caused by another person's animals.24 Georgia's first fence law,
 passed in 1759, explicitly required that:
 All fences or enclosures that shall be made around or about any garden,
 orchard, rice ground, indigo field, plantation or settlement in this province,
 shall be six feet high from the ground when staked or ridered and from the
 ground to the height of three feet of every such fence or enclosure, the rails
 thereof shall not be more than four inches distant from each other; and that all
 fences or enclosures that shall consist of paling shall likewise be six feet from
 the ground and the pales thereof not more than two inches asunder: Provided
 always, that where any fence or enclosure shall be made with a ditch or trench,
 the same shall be four feet wide, and in that case the fence shall be six feet high
 from the bottom of the ditch.25
 Those whose fences did not adhere precisely to the fence law were subject
 to treble damages if they killed or injured a stray animal on inadequately
 fenced land.26 In the 1881 decision of Hamilton v. Howard, the Georgia
 Supreme Court declared that a lawful fence had to rise five feet from the
 22 Even under the fence-law regime, "common rights" were not unlimited. Although
 people were free to allow their animals to roam the countryside, they did not, according
 to the Georgia Supreme Court, have a lawful "common title" to unenclosed land. In
 Wright H. Harrell v. Hannum and Coleman (56 Ga. 508 [1876]), the court ruled that a cattle
 farmer did not have a right to pasture in the woods or upon the unenclosed land of others.
 The cattle farmer, said the court, "does not set forth any contract, prescription or other
 lawful basis for the right he claims. What belongs to the world at large is no man's in
 particular ...."
 23 For the alleged contrast between English and "Celtic" fencing practices, see Grady
 McWhiney and Forrest McDonald, "Celtic Origins of Southern Herding Practices,"
 Journal of Southern History, LI (May 1985), 165-82. For a masterful critique, see Rowland
 Berthoff, "Celtic Mist Over the South," ibid., LII (November 1986), 523-46.
 24 Washburn and Moen Manufacturing Co., The Fence Question in the Southern States as
 Related to General Husbandry and Sheep Raising, with the History of Fence Customs, and Laws
 Pertaining Thereto: And a View of the New Farm System of the South, as Shown in the Census of
 1880 (Worcester, Mass., 1881), 10-11. For a discussion of the development of the open-
 range system in New England, see William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists,
 and the Ecology of New England (New York, 1983), Chap. 7.
 25 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 60-61. In the early nineteenth century, however,
 the Georgia General Assembly did reduce the legal height of fences by a foot. Ibid.
 26 It is unclear how widespread "lawful" fences were, for census figures do not
 distinguish between lawful and short or rickety fences. One Georgia observer declared
 that "a lawful fence is of rare occurrence in the older counties." See C. W. Howard in
 Carrollton Carroll County Times, January 10, 1873.
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 ground everywhere, rather than merely averaging that height.27 Further-
 more, an 1889 decision ruled that an agreement to dispense with a partition
 fence (one between two neighbors) was not the equivalent of a legal fence.
 Unless an actual fence-not merely a contract or agreement to dispense
 with a fence or an agreement to treat a dividing line as a fence-were
 broken, it was illegal for a farmer to harm a stray.28 The court's message
 throughout was clear: a legal fence was defined absolutely with no room for
 variations.
 In the post-Civil War era, as population expanded throughout the South,
 as blacks took advantage of their freedom to move, and as the growth of the
 railroad network facilitated marketing crops from previously isolated areas,
 population density increased in the Georgia upcountry. Carroll County's
 population growth was especially rapid: the black population surged 77
 percent during the 1870s and 67 percent during the 1880s; the white
 population also increased relatively quickly, with a total gain of 76 percent
 over the two decades. Jackson County's black population multiplied at a
 more modest rate, with an 1870 to 1890 total of 45 percent, but the white
 sector shot up 84 percent over the two decades. Overall, Carroll County's
 population grew by 89 percent from 1870 to 1890; and Jackson's, by 72
 percent.29
 To stock-law supporters, the increasing pressure on the land required
 that it be used more efficiently.30 Almost all nineteenth-century southern
 farmers used "worm" fences to enclose their crops and fences made of
 pales for their gardens and homesteads. Because worm fences were con-
 structed by laying the ends of rails on top of each other, zigzag fashion, a
 three-and-a-half to four-foot strip of land on each side of the fence was
 wasted.3" For every mile of fence, approximately one acre of productive
 land was squandered. Writing from the adjacent county of Coweta, which
 had already adopted the stock law, J. P. Reese (alias "Ripples") contended
 that "the old fence rows of Carroll county will make corn enough in three
 years to pay for all the crops that will grow in the county for the next ten
 years."32 Other savings could be made because improving small patches of
 fertile land would be profitable if they did not have to be protected by
 27 Hamilton v. Howard, 68 Ga. 288 (1881).
 28 Tumlin v. Parrott, 82 Ga. 732 (1889).
 29 A possible undercount of the Carroll County black population in 1870 does not
 detract from these trends. If 1860, rather than 1870, is used as the base year, the growth
 rates of the total population in the two counties were 86 percent and 81 percent,
 respectively.
 30 There was only a small movement to enact stock laws in the comparatively sparsely
 settled antebellum South. See King, "Closing of the Southern Range," 55-56.
 31 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 22, 1885; and Washburn and Moen, Fence Question,
 16. "Subscriber," in Southern Cultivator, XXXVI (January 1878), 7, gave the total width of
 the strip as between six and seven, rather than eight, feet.
 32 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, April 17, 1885. In the heat of argument, "Ripples"
 unquestionably exaggerated.
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 fences.33 Jackson County's Eugene F. Adair predicted that "if there was a
 law compelling owners of stock to keep them under a fence, we could clear
 and plant just such pieces of land as we thought best. Leaving out the
 poorest, we could plant where we pleased, no matter how small, or in what
 shape it might be."-' Defenders of the fence law derided the claimed
 savings in land as exaggerated, but they denied neither the general point nor
 its importance.35
 The consensus among both stock-law and fence-law supporters that the
 choice between the two laws depended on the demographic, ecological,
 and economic conditions of the locale demonstrates that this was not
 primarily a cultural controversy. As T. D. Henderson, the state agriculture
 commissioner, noted, "It is not expected that the stock law will be adopted
 in the wire-grass counties of the state, where the larger area is in pasture." In
 most of the counties of north Georgia, however, "the adoption of the stock
 law is only a question of time," he believed.`6 Likewise, at the 1878 meeting
 of the Georgia State Agricultural Society, a stock-law opponent from Clay
 County conceded, "In Middle and Upper Georgia, I have no doubt it [the
 stock law] would operate well; but it would not do in Southern Georgia. No
 further south than Decatur county there are thousands of acres good for
 stock, and unless the stock run at large these lands do no good."37 In an 1883
 editorial, the Jefferson (Ga.) Jackson Herald declared, "It stands to reason,
 that in an agricultural country stock is not of such great importance as the
 13 Since the area of a square piece of land increases by the square of each side, and that
 of other shapes grows by similar amounts, owners of small plots had to split proportion-
 ately many more rails than owners of larger farms, if, indeed, either fenced in his land.
 A simple example shows the consequences in wasted land. Suppose a piece of land were
 square and 100 feet on each side. Then the total area would be 100 X 100 = 10,000 square
 feet. The amount occupied by a worm fence would be 100 X 7 X 4 = 2,800 square feet (i.e.,
 length times width times number of sides). (We used the smaller estimate of width to
 minimize the figure for wasted land.) But at each corner, the fences would overlap, so we
 must eliminate 7 X 7 X 4 = 196 square feet (width times width times number of corners).
 So the fence would take up 2,604 square feet, or 26 percent, of the land. If the square were
 1,000 feet long, a similar calculation shows that the percentage occupied by the fence
 would amount to only about 2.8 percent of the larger field. (If all fences were on the edges
 of every farmer's land, so that only half of the width of each fence would have to be
 subtracted from the land of each farmer, the calculations would lead to analogous
 percentages of 13.5 and 1.4.) This admittedly extreme example demonstrates two
 principles: first, it could be relatively wasteful to fence small fertile portions of fields;
 second, where fences were maintained, the burden of the fence law fell disproportionally
 on small, not large, farmers.
 34Jefferson (Ga.) Forest News, December 24, 1880. TheJackson Herald was the successor
 to this newspaper.
 35 "Subscriber," in Southern Cultivator, XXXVI (January 1878), 7-8.
 36 Henderson quoted in Carrollton Carroll County Times, August 4, 1882. For a detailed
 calculation of the discounted net present value of the expected profitability of a change
 to the stock law in the six standard regions of Georgia in 1880, which strongly supports
 Henderson's statement, see Shawn Everett Kantor, "Razorbacks, Ticky Cows, and the
 Closing of the Georgia Open Range: The Dynamics of Institutional Change Uncovered,"
 Journal of Economic History, LI (December 1991), 866-70.
 37 Proceedings of the Georgia State Agricultural Society, 1876 to 1878 (Atlanta, 1878), 415-16.
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 crops, hence they should be confined. If this was a stock country the crops,
 which would be small and insignificant, ought to be fenced."38 Although he
 disagreed with the newspaper about which arrangement was to be pre-
 ferred, a fence-law advocate from the Fair Play district of Jackson County
 accepted the notion that the decision on whether to adopt the stock law
 depended on "denseness or sparseness of population, the geographical
 situation, irigation ...."39
 On this issue, each side's proponents in Carroll and Jackson Counties
 clashed less on principles than on facts. Thus, "School Boy" of Carroll
 County admitted that "when our fathers first settled this connty [sic] and
 our range was good and when the acreage in cultivation was smalll, the
 present system of fencing was proper, but now we have no range, cows are
 hungry and often in our or our neighbors fields, the acreage of cleared land
 is more than that for pastures."40 A week later, "Con," a fence-law sup
 porter, asserted that "There is at least three-fourths of our land in the range
 or commons ... ."4 Longtime Carroll County resident and stock-law sup-
 porter J. 0. R. Word reflected on earlier days: "Forty nine years ag[o] father
 moved to thiss county. It was then a fine range for stock. I[t] was then the
 best economy to fence up our crops, for our farms were small and far
 between and range fresh and large."42 In Jackson County in 1876 John G.
 Justice, a prominent Democrat whose fann was worth three-and-a-half
 times the value of the average farm in Jackson County, contended that the
 county was not yet suitable for the stock law, which was "only adapted to
 those countries so densely populated as to afford no pasturage outside the
 enclosed lands ...." Ten years later, "J. B." of the same county came to
 quite a different conclusion: "There is absolutely nothing outside [the
 fenced areas] for the stock to graze on-no range wor anything ...."44
 "Ripples" stated it more succinctly: "This is not a range country like it once
 was."45
 Though more rhetorical, other statements by fence-law champions also
 accepted the common pool argument. White Republican and stock raiser
 William D. Loworn of Carroll County saw no reason for the stock law
 because "the woods are full of grass and acorns part of the year. They were
 38JeffersonJackson Herald, July 20, 1883.
 39 Ibid., June 17, 1881.
 40 Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 1, 1882.
 41 Ibid., September 8, 1882.
 42 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 1, 1885.
 43 Jefferson Forest News, September 16, 1876.
 44JeffersonJackson Herald, March 5, 1886.
 45 Newnan (Ga.) HeraldJune 30, 1881. For other examples of agreement by both sides
 on the criteria of "denseness or sparseness of population, the geographical situation,
 irrigation," and other factors, see, e.g., Jefferson Forest News, September 19, 1879;
 JeffersonJackson Herald, June 17, 1881; and Carrollton Carroll FreePress, April 17 and May
 1, 1885. Both Carroll andJackson Counties were below the state average in the number
 of milch cows, other cattle, sheep, and swine, and the overall value of livestock in 1880,
 and above the state average in the proportion of improved acreage to total farm acreage.
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 put here by our Creator for benefit to his people, and I don't think it right to
 deprive a large majority to please a minority."4 J. W. Pitts expanded
 Lowomn's analysis: "We have acorns, hickory-nuts, chestnuts and m[o]ss
 for hogs and in most parts we have a splendid range of grass. Wouldn't it be
 foolishness to shut our stock from it? Of course it would." Although Pitts
 believed that Carroll's natural resources were large enough to make the
 stock law unnecessary, he did not categorically dismiss the idea that fences
 would one day be necessary: "While they [trees] are all cut down and
 washed away in a great many places, Carroll boasts of plenty of timber, one
 thousand acres or more in one body, while the fields are small. It's the other
 way in those counties [that have adopted the stock law], and when Carroll
 gets in that condition we'll give up for no fence, and not before."47
 Reformers in Jackson and Carroll Counties claimed that the stock law
 would save farmers both labor and capital. "It takes away most of the profit
 of fanning to keep up good fences," announced I. H. P. Beck, a landless
 fanner, schoolteacher, and later local leader in the Farmers' Alliance and
 the Populist and Republican parties.48 "P." of Thompson's Mills, Jackson
 County, estimated that "it takes one-tenth of the time spent on the fann to
 repair fences. Could not we spend it more profitably? Could we not use that
 time in making compost heaps?"49 "Plow Boy" suggested that "we should
 dispense with fences ... because we could spend our time at something
 that would be much more remunerative than patching up fences such as
 making our manure heaps larger, stopping washes, etc., besides we would
 have no other stock to see after but our own."950 Likewise, Eugene Adair
 asserted that "while we used to split and haul rails, we could, under this
 arrangement [the stock law], with the same labor, be making manure to
 improve the land intended to be cultivated."5' Farmers cared more about
 compost heaps than capitalism.
 46 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, June 5, 1885. For Lovvorn's longtime Republican
 activism, see ibid., March 15, 1895. According to the 1880 census manuscripts, the value
 of Lovvorn's livestock was higher than that of any other participant in the fence-law debate
 in the two counties who could be traced to the census. Philo H. Chandler, who switched
 sides during the 1880s and became a stock-law supporter, valued his livestock at the same
 amount as Lovvorn did. Lovvorn owned seventy-five acres of forest land and fifty-nine
 tilled acres, and his livestock was worth nearly four times that of the average owner-
 operated Carroll County farm.
 47 Carrollton Carroll County Times, August 25 and September 8, 1882.
 48 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 15, 1885. For Beck's Alliance, Populist, and
 Republican activity, see ibid., February 28, 1890, April 15, May 6 and July 8, 1892, and
 March 15, 1895.
 49 JeffersonJackson Herald, August 3, 1883.
 5o Carrollton Carroll Free Press, April 17, 1885.
 Sl Jefferson Forest News, December 24, 1880. Similarly, see Proceedings of the Georgia
 State Agricultural Society, 1876 to 1878, pp. 412, and 419-22; Home and Farm, quoted in
 Jefferson Forest News, April 23, 1880; Anson (N.C.) Times, quoted in Jefferson Jackson
 Herald, April 15, 1881; Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 22, 1885; Southern Cultivator,
 XXXV (August 1877), 299-300; and Southern Cultivator and Dixie Farmer, XL (December
 1882), 17, and XLI (June 1883), 2.
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 Other stock-law advocates tried to make more precise calculations of the
 economic disadvantages of the status quo. "The whole subject," the Jefferson
 Jackson Herald announced, "is one that can be reduced to dollars and
 cents."52 For instance, "School Boy" claimed that "the fences of Carroll
 county are worth three times more than all the hogs, cows and sheep in the
 county, and I ... ask. .. if it is economy for a man to have one dollar
 invested in a business and it takes three t[o] keep that one dollar up."53 A
 correspondent from Villa Rica in Carroll County contended that "the land
 taken up by the fence around a man's farm will produce more than the value
 of the stock fenced out."m After diligent computation, "Vande Linctum"
 found that "for every dollar invested in livestock in the State, two dollars
 are required for the construction of fences to protect the growing crops."55
 "Hopeful" from Human's Store, Jackson County, "found out that it costs us
 twice as much to fence out stock as it does to pay our taxes, and besides we
 have had about enough of our crops destroyed by stock to pay our
 taxes .... s56 Adair of Jackson County computed an initial cost of $210 for
 the materials and labor needed to fence one hundred acres.57 One of the few
 stock-law opponents to counter this argument, Abner Nixon, who tilled
 nearly twice as many acres as the average owner-operator in Carroll
 County and whose farm was worth nearly twice the county average,
 admitted that fencing stock would save timber but preferred, instead, more
 intensive farming: "I think a better way would be for us to turn out more
 than half our land we have under old broke down fences and put good
 fences around as much land as we can put in a proper state [of] cultivation.
 It would certainly be much better to raise 40 bushels of corn per acre on 8
 acres of [land] than 8 bushels per acre on 40 acres of land."58 Both stock-
 law advocates and opponents showed the calculating state of mind
 52JeffersonJackson Herald, June 20, 1883.
 53 Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 1, 1882.
 54 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 1, 1885.
 55 JeffersonJackson Herald, June 17, 1881.
 56Jefferson Forest News, September 5, 1879.
 57 Ibid., December 24, 1880. Similarly, see Southern Cultivator, XXXIV (May 1876), 178-
 79, (June 1876), 220, XXXV (August 1877), 299-300, and XXXIX (January 1881), 15-16;
 Carrollton Carroll County Times, August 4, 1882; and Newnan Herald,July 28, 1881.
 58 Carrollton Carroll Free PressJune 26, 1885. For a similar argument from a legal (not
 a moral) angle, see "Noxin Renba" (Abner Nixon spelled backwards) ibid., May 8, 1885.
 In the June 26 letter, Nixon also responded to the contention that the depredations of
 wandering stock unfairly reduced the value of farmers' land by arguing that the price of
 land had always taken into account the fact that stock could run free: "The citizens of this
 county have and always have had the legal, moral, and the Bible right to let their stock,
 unless of a dangerous character, run at large. We all know [sic] this when we purchased
 our lands." Since he embedded his reference to "Bible right" in a rather sophisticated
 classical economic argument, the religious phrase should not be interpreted, as Hahn, in
 Roots of Southern Populism, 252, does, as evidence of adherence to "a vision of the
 cooperative commonwealth." Both sides, of course, could and did claim biblical authority.
 Stock-law supporters in a debate at Lickskillit, Georgia, contended that "the law is a legal
 law and can be established by the scriptures asjust and right." Carrollton CarrollFreePress,
 June 5, 1885. If "B.'s" stock destroyed "A.'s" crops, remarked a Sparta, Georgia, farmer,
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 characteristic of capitalism, and neither side rejected the market.
 Even more often than they stressed saving labor and capital, reformers
 prophesied that the stock law would improve the quality of livestock and,
 thus, yield better meat and dairy products.59 While fencing in stock might
 reduce the quantity of livestock, the improved quality of the animals would
 more than compensate for the loss in number. The argument by "Ripples"
 was typical:
 The milk and butter is free from poisons taken from cows that are kept up [i.e.,
 fenced in] and then you know what your cattle eat. But when they woods it, you
 don't know when you are drinking or eating deadly poisons. Butter made from
 cows kept up is much richer than from those cows that are allowed to run at
 large. There is as much difference as between gold and nickle silver. The beef
 is fatter, tenderer and better. Breed stock can be improved. One good cow well
 fed and pastured is worth 5 ticky woods cows. Two hogs kept up is worth ten
 razor backs running at large.
 Others asserted that Coweta County, which passed the stock law in 1881,
 was self-sufficient in meat while Carroll was not. "Here are two counties,
 one self sustaining and the other not," "Plow Boy" wrote in 1885 in the
 Carrollton (Ga.) Carroll Free Press, "and yet some will tell you that you
 cant raise hogs in a stock law county." "Ripples," who lived in Coweta but
 often wrote for the Carroll County newspapers, admitted that "we don't
 have quite so many hogs over here in Coweta as we used to have" before
 Coweta passed a stock law, but he assured residents of Carroll County that
 Coweta hogs "are a heap bigger and fatter."60 The response by "L. F. L.,"
 that "Grandpa and grandma milked ticky cows and they lived a heap better
 than we do," was almost self-mocking.6'
 Unlike their grandparents, upcountry residents of the late nineteenth
 century increasingly enjoyed easy access to national and international
 markets. What James C. Bonner concluded about Carroll County charac-
 terized the whole upcountry: "The railroads did more to quicken the
 economic tempo of Carroll County than any other event during [the
 nineteenth] century."62 Railroads reached Carrollton, Carroll County's seat,
 "it is clear that as B.'s property caused the damage, he ought to be the loser. The Bible
 sustains this idea, as in the case of A.'s ox killing B.'s ox." Southern Cultivator XXXVI
 (December 1878), 451. Private property, according to a North Carolina paper quoted
 ibid., XXXIX (January 1881),15-16, "is founded upon correct moral principles, laid down
 in the first legal work ever given to man, the code, by that great law giver, Moses."
 59 For evidence of the correctness of their prophecies, see Kantor, 'The Causes and
 Consequences of Southern Enclosure, 1850-1890" (unpub. paper, University of Arizona,
 1991).
 60 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, April 17 (first and second quotations), May 1 (third
 quotation), 1885. Similarly, see Carrollton Carroll County Times, January 10, 1873, and
 September 8, 1882; Anson Times, quoted in Jefferson Jackson Herald, April 15, 1881;
 JeffersonJackson Herald, August 24, 1883, October 31, 1884, March 20 and August 2,
 1885; and Carrollton Carroll Free Press, June 19, 1885.
 61 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, April 24, 1883.
 62 Bonner, Georgia's Last Frontier, 99. Georgia railroad miles increased from 1,548 in
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 in 1874; Villa Rica, the county's second largest town, in 1882; and Jefferson,
 the Jackson County seat, in 1884. Not only did the railroad allow farmers
 and stock raisers to market their products more cheaply and efficiently, it
 also helped to increase production itself by enabling upcountry farmers to
 import large amounts of commercial fertilizer.63 Increased productivity and
 profitability in turn stimulated the land market, which raised the stakes of
 the fence-law controversy.
 Like railroad promoters, fence-law refonners focused on future eco-
 nomic gains. In a Darwinian allusion, "Edgar" declared that "we must
 learn to give way to the fittest, for by so doing we will keep prospering, and
 if not, we will never prosper."64 Even more certain of the stock law's
 necessity, Jackson County's "P." stated, "I regard it [the stock law] as the
 preliminary step to the prosperity of the agriculturalists of Jackson county." 65
 On the eve of the first fence election in Carroll County, "Ripples" chided
 his opponents: "Dont say the time is not yet come to begin to economize."66
 Opponents were guilty of "old fogyism, general ignorance and backward-
 ness" for favoring a system in force "in no civilized portion of the world."67
 "Economy is what the Southern fanner has not learned yet."tS Stock-law
 champions would teach him.
 While advocates of the new regime stressed progress, their opponents
 just as superficially invoked tradition. Thus, Jackson County's "Fair Play"
 forthrightly sought to preserve the status quo: "Our present system of
 fencing is an old one-so old that it would seem cruel to attempt an
 innovation upon it."O Another saw the fence law as an embodiment of "the
 liberty that our forefathers fought for."70 "G. W. C." of Carroll County
 expressed a different attitude toward risk than his stock-law neighbors: "He
 [I. H. P. Beck] says that he would rather jump into something new than to
 stand still and die in stagnation. There's where we differ, I would rather
 stagnate than to die in the stock law." Such statements made easy targets for
 New South rhetoric: "'By long usage our people are accustomed to the
 wagons, and why should we now try to supplant them by an engine?
 1867 to 2,459 in 1880 (a 59 percent increase) and to 4,600.8 in 1890 (a further 87 percent
 increase). See H. V. and H. W. Poor, Poor's Manual of Railroads of the United States (New
 York, 1868-1924), 1880 Vol., p. v, 1888 Vol., p. xxv, and 1895 Vol., p. xxxvi. The best brief
 introduction to the development of the postbellum upcountry economy in Georgia also
 emphasizes the importance of the railroad. See David F. Weiman, "The Economic
 Emancipation of the Non-Slaveholding Class: Upcountry Farmers in the Georgia Cotton
 Economy,"Journal of Economic History XLV (March 1985), 71-93.
 63 See Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 145-52; and Weiman, "Economic Emanci-
 pation."
 64 Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 1, 1882.
 65JeffersonJackson Herald, August 3, 1883.
 66 Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 8, 1882.
 67 Home and Farm, quoted in Jefferson Forest News, April 23, 1880.
 68i Carrollton Carroll County Times, May 3, 1878.
 69 JeffersonJackson Herald, June 17, 1881.
 70 Quoted in Flynn, White Land, Black Labor, 131.
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 Whew! Supreme folly!' The fence law as we now have it was itself, at one
 age of the world, a new thing." Or, as another reformer jeered: "Does
 improvement, progress and enterprise mean cruelty? Then Webster stands
 revised."7'
 What the stock-law advocates wished to conserve was not the rhetorical
 ideals opportunistically employed by both sides in the controversy, but
 tangible resources. They thought that unchecked exploitation of forests to
 build extensive networks of fences robbed future generations and threat-
 ened to denude the areas of timber. As J. 0. R. Word insisted, "this is a
 question of vast importance not only to the present, but to the future
 generation," and a few weeks later he declared, "I speak in behalf of saving
 the timber for the benefit of the future generation... ." "Vande Linctum"
 claimed that "the repair of fences annually calls for the destruction of nearly
 100,000 acres of timber, which, when taken in connection with other
 depletions of forest in the next half century, will leave the entire country
 destitute of timber." Moreover, since railroads not only used wood for ties
 but also made it possible to sell timber in a larger marketplace, the
 expansion of the rail network made lumber more valuable than it had been
 when the upcountry was isolated and self-sufficient. As "Ripples" re-
 marked, "If I owned the timber of Carroll county I would not want any
 bigger fortune. The way to save your timber is adopt the stock law."72
 Although the Georgia General Assembly of 1879 allowed barbed wire to
 be classed as a legal fence for the purpose of keeping out larger draft
 animals, the wire was relatively expensive, and reformers believed, no
 doubt correctly, that upcountry farmers would continue to build more
 wooden fences for some time.73
 To concrete arguments for efficiency, prosperity, and conservation,
 stock-law advocates sometimes added more philosophical appeals. The
 concept of private property, proponents of the stock law repeated endlessly,
 was incompatible with the open range. Apparently realizing the potency of
 an appeal to private property, opponents of the stock law rarely responded,
 as they presumably would have if they had believed that there was a
 consensus on communitarian values. "What belongs to me I have a perfect
 right to do as I please with it, what does not, I have no right to at all,"
 71 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, June 19, 1885 (first quotation); and JeffersonJackson
 Herald, June 24, 1881 (second and third quotations).
 72 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 1 and June 12, 1885 (U. 0. R. Word quotations);
 Jefferson Jackson Herald, June 17, 1881 (Vande Linctum quotation); and Carrollton
 Carroll County Times, September 8, 1882 (Ripples quotation). In the Middle West, the
 conflict over fence laws began in the 1840s and 1850s because of the area's smaller timber
 resources, according to Hayter, "Livestock-Fencing Conflicts,' 13.
 " Ga. Acs ... 1878-79, No. 304, p. 165. The specifications of the legal barbed wire
 fences were revised in Ga. Acts ... 1882-83, No. 440, p. 139. It was not only the relative
 cost of barbed wire that bothered farmers but also that the wire was thought to injure
 animals who ran against it. For evidence that farmers were cautious about adopting wire
 fences, see Southern Cultivator, XXXIX (October 1881), 376 and (December 1881), 444.
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 remarked S. B. Orr of Carroll County.74 "I am compelled to build a lawful
 fence: or in other words a fence, 'horse-high, bull-strong and pig-tight,' to
 protect my own growing crop," said "P." of Thompson's Mills, Jackson
 County. "Is that just? If this land belongs to me, has your stock any right to
 anything that grows upon it without my consent? That is my property. As a
 matter of justice, as a matter of policy, what right have you to the grasses
 that grow on the land of yourneighbor? It is only a permissive right, there is
 no legal or moral right in it. "75 "Where does one man have a right to let his
 stock run over, and feed upon another's land?" asked "L.," a landless
 citizen of Carroll County in 1878.76 Future Populist district committeeman
 I. H. P. Beck proclaimed, "A man's land is his own and one man's cow has
 no right to run on another's land inclosed [sic] or not."77
 Drawing on familiar Jeffersonian rhetoric, reformers attacked fence
 laws as incompatible with republican independence. As "L." advised, "If
 you have stock, own a piece of land to put them on, and keep them; not have
 them, and allow them to run over other's property."78 Not only did stock-
 law advocates claim that roving stock illegally violated their personal
 property rights, they also believed that their neighbors had a moral obliga-
 tion to respect these rights. Appealing to the individualistic tradition of
 natural rights, J. 0. R. Word proclaimed that "from a sense of justice
 between man and man, I think that every man should be compelled to take
 care of his own stock, that he has no moral right to turn loose his stock to
 prowl around upon his neighbor's crop."79 Illustrating the incongruity of
 common grazing rights within a more general system of private property,
 proponents of the stock law posed homespun analogies: "A man has as
 much tight to take his household and kitchen furniture and put it in another
 man's house and kitchen, as he does for his stock to run on his neighbor's
 enclosed or unenclosed [land]."80 A Carrollton Carroll Free Press reporter
 from Villa Rica described the logical implication of a law that allowed an
 individual's stock to graze upon a neighbor's land: "If he has this right, then
 by the same reasoning, he would be entitled to all the property not sheltered.
 A buggy or wagon left from under the shelter would be public property."'8
 74 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 1, 1885.
 75 JeffersonJackson Herald, August 3, 1883.
 76 Carrollton Carroll County Times, June 7, 1878.
 77 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 15, 1885. Similarly, see Southern Cultivator, XXXIV
 (June 1876),220, (December 1876),461, XXXVI (December 1878),451, XXXIX (January
 1881), 15-16, XL (December 1882), 17; Proceedings of the Georgia State Agricultural Society,
 1876 to 1878, pp. 412, 415, and 419-22; Home and Farm, quoted inJefferson Forest News,
 April 23, 1880;JeffersonJackson HeraldJune 17, 1881,June 29, 1883, and April 3, 1885;
 and Carrollton Carroll County Times, January 10, 1873, and September 1, 1882.
 78 Carrollton Carroll County Times, May 3, 1878.
 7 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 1, 1885.
 B Ibid., April 17, 1885.
 81 Ibid., May 1, 1885. The editor of the Athens, Georgia, Southern Cultivator, XXXVI
 (January 1878), 8-9, stated the rights claim and the contradiction succinctly: "If one holds
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 Significantly, opponents and proponents of the stock law agreed on the
 desirability of protecting private property, but they disagreed on the best
 way to do -so. Private property seemed commonsensical to men of the
 nineteenth-century upcountry. Thus, fence-law supporter "Fair Play" of
 Jackson County declared that "viewing the question from a strictly legal
 standpoint, it would seem to be just to enact some law whereby every one
 should be protected in the full use and enjoyment of whatever property
 rightfully belonged to him; as for instance it would appear meet and proper
 that the owner of lands should have the same right to restrain others from
 grazing stock on his premises as he would to prevent them from felling his
 timber."82 Although Hahn leaves out the part of the letter by "Fair Play" just
 quoted, he does quote the succeeding lines: "Our present system is an old
 one-so old that it would seem cruel to attempt an innovation upon it. From
 long usage our people have become accustomed to it, and any change in or
 abridgment of it will unquestionably work serious injury to a large number
 of our citizens." Far from reflecting a competing moral system or "expres-
 sion of natural right," as Hahn contends, the whole statement by "Fair Play"
 accepts private property as moral but bemoans its consequence for those
 who would be losers if the open range were closed. This is hardly tanta-
 mount to endorsing a "cooperative commonwealth" but rather represents a
 standard political appeal that has been used by the Right as well as the Left
 from time out of mind.83
 Agreement on the principle of private property left fence-law advocates
 open to charges of inconsistency: "Why is it," asked "Vande Linctum" of
 Jackson County, "that if I climb over my neighbor's fence, four and a half
 feet high, and cut, trample, break down, or in any manner injure or destroy
 his wheat, corn, cotton or other crops, that the law punishes me, yet my
 stockmay cross the very same fence and commit the same depredations and
 the law protects them?"T4 While Hahn admits that fence-law supporters
 believed in some private property rights, he contends that only stock-law
 advocates accepted what he terms "absolute property" and that private
 property and free-grazing rights did not appear contradictory in nineteenth-
 century upcountry society. But as the statement by "Fair Play" demonstrates,
 the fine distinction is Hahn's, not that of the debaters of the 1880s, and the
 contradiction was as evident to at least some nineteenth-century eyes as to
 those of the twentieth century.85 Although other fence-law supporters
 afee simple to land, he is entitled to all the fruits and benefits of it, including pasturage.
 His neighbors have no right to pasture their stock upon it.... If all your neighbors should
 fence in all their lands, your stock would be confined to your own land for support; but
 you could not complain, for it is fully admitted they have the right to enclose every acre
 they own."
 82JeffersonJackson Herald, June 17, 1881.
 83 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 252.
 84JeffersonJackson Herald, June 10, 1881. A legal fence was five feet tall.
 85 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 251 (quotation), and 253.
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.150 on Tue, 05 Sep 2017 23:01:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 218 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY
 ignored the contradiction between the principle of private property and the
 practice of unimpeded grazing, their silence provides no evidence that they
 explicitly questioned that principle, which Hahn's larger argument requires.
 Rather, free grazing was for them merely a convenient exception to the
 regime of private property.
 Since the decision on whether or not to enforce strict property rights
 would be made by voters in collective referenda rather than by individual
 bargainers in a market, a good deal of the debate consisted of appeals for
 support and attempts to shape coalitions. Although they did not use the
 phrase, stock-law proponents understood the concept of a Pareto improve-
 ment (a change that makes at least one person better off without making
 anyone else worse off), and they freely admitted that their reform would not
 help everyone. "School Boy," for example, stated, "I will admit that there
 are a few men that it [the stock law] will not suit-though I think it will
 benefit twenty-five where it will injure one." In similar fashion, J. 0. R.
 Word reasoned, "Admitting the no fence law would work a hardship
 against a few, would it not be the part of wisdom to legislate for the best
 good of many[?]" "Submuloc" of Jackson County agreed: "We need not
 hope to please everybody, for that is impossible. Our object should be to
 promote the general good, and our motto 'Pro Bono Publico.' '' In a
 system of majority rule, the proposed law did not need to benefit everyone
 to be adopted.
 Some historians have asserted that the fence debate split the society into
 two neat groups. Flynn arrayed laborers and tenants of both races along
 with "very small farmers, the poorer end of the landowning class" on one
 side and richer white landowners on the other.87 Hahn saw the combatants
 as "the mass of Upcountry yeomen, tenants, and laborers" against "land-
 lords, merchants, and business interests."88 This is not, however, the only
 possible division. If voters cast their ballots for the stock or fence law so as
 to maximize their expected incomes, if the market for labor was competi-
 tive, and if transaction costs were so high that private agreements were not
 a viable solution, then the lineup of socioeconomic groups ought to have
 been more complex than Flynn and Hahn claim.89
 " Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 1, 1882; Carrollton Carroll Free Press,
 May 1, 1885; andJeffersonJackson Herald, March 20, 1885.
 87 Flynn, White Land, Black Labor, 145.
 88 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 248 and 262 (quotations).
 89 The competitiveness of the postbellum southern labor market and the markedly free
 geographic mobility of black laborers are discussed in Robert Higgs, Competition and
 Coercion: Blacks in the American Economy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge, London, and Melbourne,
 1977), 37-55; Stephen J. DeCanio, Agriculture in the Postbellum South: The Economics of
 Production and Supply (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1974), 16-76;Joseph D. Reid,Jr.,
 "Sharecropping as an Understandable Market Response: The Post-Bellum South,"Journal
 of Economic History, XXXIII (March 1973), 106-30; Gavin Wright, Old South, New South:
 Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York, 1986), 64-70; and
 William Cohen, At Freedom's Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial
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 TABLE 1
 OCCUPATIONS OF HousEHoLD HEADs
 CARRoLL AND JACKSON CouNTUs, GEORGIA, 1880
 % White Household Heads % Black Household Heads
 Occupation Carroll Jackson Carroll Jackson
 Farmer
 Landholdinga 45.3 43.6 5.4 5.1
 Non-Landholding 25.3 10.0 37.0 4.0
 Labored 13.6 34.9 41.1 86.2
 Capitalists
 Trade 2.9 2.3 0.0 0.1
 Professionalc 3.1 3.1 0.8 0.5
 Serviced 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0
 Skilled and
 Semiskilled' 4.5 3.8 1.8 1.2
 Other Laborer 5.0 2.0 13.6 2.9
 Other 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
 Nf 2,683 2,086 389 896
 Agricultural N 2,264 1,845 325 854
 a The numbers in the "landholding fanner" and farm "laborer" rows are substantially different
 from those that Hahn reports. The reason is that 253 white and 44 black household heads in Carroll
 and 173 whites and 34 blacks in Jackson reported their occupations as "fanner" but were not
 recorded in the agricultural census. We therefore considered these individuals as farm laborers.
 b Includes merchants, grocers, other shopkeepers, salespeople, and hucksters.
 Includes lawyers, physicians, clergy, teachers, and political officials.
 "Includes hotel, stable, warehouse, and saloon keepers.
 'Includes artisans and helpers likely to acquire a skill such as "works in blacksmith shop."
 fDoes not include household heads reporting no occupation, "keeping house," or "student" and
 does not include persons in jail or in the poorhouse.
 SOURCE: Manuscript Population Schedules of Carroll and Jackson Counties, Georgia. The data
 set includes all households that the census enumerated.
 First, consider landowners. If the stock law passed and a landowner
 expected to be a net loser, he or she would experience the full effect of the
 loss, all other things being equal. Clearly, as Flynn and Hahn argue,
 Control, 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge and London, 1991), xi-xvi. Since there were clearly
 many buyers and sellers of labor in the market, since (as the population increase figures
 cited earlier show) labor was very mobile, and since the 1880s were relatively prosperous
 years for southern farmers, those who doubt that the labor market in the upcountry was
 competitive bear a heavy burden of proof. Contemporaries recognized this. As a stock-law
 supporter in Coweta County, who was trying to convince tenants and farm laborers to
 support his side, put it in 1881: "Never was [there] such demand for work of all kinds as
 in these days." Newnan HeraldJune 30, 1881. Moreover, stock-law supporters conceded,
 as Carroll County's "School Boy" affirmed: "We all know that th[i]s black population vote
 for fence and they are so prejudiced that whenever the [stock] law is carried over their
 heads, they will at once leave without waiting to see whether its [sic] a good or bad law."
 Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 1, 1882.
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.150 on Tue, 05 Sep 2017 23:01:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 2 20 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY
 yeomen farmers who relied on the open range to feed their animals should
 have been solidly against any redefinition of property rights.90 Wealthy
 stock raisers, whom they do not mention, should also have opposed any
 change.91 Conversely, owners of land suitable for pasture but not as appro-
 priate for growing crops should have expected to profit from the stock law
 and, consequently, should have been well disposed toward refonn.
 If landowners could be expected to divide over the issue and tenants and
 laborers to support the fence law overwhelmingly, as Hahn and Flynn
 contend, then stock-law supporters should have had no chance of success in
 these two counties. Table 1 shows the occupations of black and white
 household heads in Carroll and Jackson Counties. Tenants and laborers of
 both races made up substantial proportions of the voting populations in
 both counties, respectively 43.9 and 46.9 of the white and 91.7 and 93.1 of
 the black household heads. In addition, 72.4 percent and 57.6 percent of the
 white farm owners in Carroll and Jackson Counties, respectively, operated
 fans with less than fifty acres of tilled land. In sum, yeomen, tenants, and
 laborers were the overwhelming majority of the electorate in both counties,
 and if they acted as these historians say they did, there should have been no
 contest over the fence law.
 But tenants cannot so easily be placed in the fence-law camp on the basis
 of first principles as Hahn and Flynn assert.92 Imagine a landowner and a
 90 Explicit calculations of the amount of money that each landowner and tenant in the
 two counties could have expected to gain or lose from the stock law in 1880 show that 52
 percent of the "winning" landowners tilled fewer than forty acres and 40 percent of the
 "losing" landowners tilled more than forty acres. By this measure of material self-interest,
 not every small farmer should have opposed the stock law and not every large farmer
 should have favored it. See below for a fuller explanation of the "savings" measure.
 91 According to a Mr. Carmichael, "We have been eaten up by big cotton planters' stock
 and their tenants, and the widows and orphans of our county and our immediate
 neighborhood have had to abandon their little farms since the war, on account of these
 big men and their big herds of stock." Proceedings of the Georgia State Agricultural Society,
 1876 to 1878, pp. 414-15. Ellickson found in Shasta County, California, that the impetus
 for a move to close the range came from the depredations of the animals belonging to a
 large cattle raiser and that, while many small property holders favored a stock law, the
 major cattle owners favored continuation of the open range. "Of Coase and Cattle," 647-53.
 92 We use the term "tenant" generically. For our purposes it is not important to
 distinguish among cash renters, share tenants, or sharecroppers, because all three might
 or might not own animals and all might be able to bargain for pasture rights. By "tenant"
 we mean to imply that the farmer did not own his or her land and therefore signed a
 contract with a landowner specifying, for example, the rent (in-kind or cash), the level of
 landowner supervision, and the amount of forest and pasture provided by the owner,
 among other things. See LeeJ. Alston and Robert Higgs, "Contractual Mix in Southern
 Agriculture Since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests,"Journal ofEconomic History,
 XLII (June 1982), 327-53; Robert Higgs, "Race, Tenure, and Resource Allocation in
 Southern Agriculture, 1910,"Jourmal of Economic History, XXXIII (March 1973), 149-69;
 Higgs, "Patterns of Farm Rental in the Georgia Cotton Belt, 1880-1900,"Journal of
 Economic History, XXXIV (June 1974), 468-82; Reid, "Sharecropping as an Understand-
 able Market Response"; and Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South:
 Households, Markets, and Wealth in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1978), 160-80 for
 discussions of the contractual choices available to both the landowner and land-poor.
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 tenant signing a contract stipulating that the landowner would furnish no
 pasture and therefore the tenant had to provide for his or her animals
 elsewhere. In the rental contract between James Willbanks and C. M.
 Wood, a landlord from Harmony Grove, Jackson County, for example, the
 subject of pasturage was made quite explicit. Not only was Willbanks "to
 take care of said farm as it was his own," but it was stated also that "there is
 to be noe pastureing on the land of said place that are in cultivation. "93 If the
 rental contract forbade pasturing on cultivated acreage and provided no
 pasture or unimproved land on which animals could forage, tenants then
 had four options: they could pen their animals and feed them purchased
 grain or fodder grown on their own small fans, send animals out into the
 forest to find food, rent pasture, or keep no animals.94 Whether a tenant
 signed such an agreement or received pasture as part of the contract, the net
 income that each of these tenants expected to receive should have been
 roughly equal, holding everything else constant, if the market for labor was
 competitive across the region. Simple economic reasoning shows that
 under a fence-law regime, any landlord in a competitive labor market
 would have to offer a tenant a contract of the same total value, substituting
 other incentives for pasture, if he or she did not offer pasture. Otherwise,
 the landlord would attract fewer tenants or less competent ones.95 Similar
 reasoning suggests that if the stock law were adopted, competition for
 tenants should have compelled the landowner to compensate any tenant
 whose animals had previously been dependent on the open range by giving
 him or her pasture, taking a smaller share of the crop, or reducing the cash
 rent. As a group, therefore, tenants should have been indifferent between
 the stock and fence laws. A similar argument can be made with respect to
 the before and after wages of farm laborers.96
 93 "Day Book of C. M. Wood," in the A. D. O'Rear Collection (Georgia Department of
 Archives and History, Atlanta).
 94 In Carroll County 714 of 910 tenant farmers (78 percent) reported no pasture or
 unimproved land, and inJackson County 144 of 344 tenants (42 percent) were in the same
 situation, according to our 100 percent sample of the 1880 Agricultural Manuscript
 Schedules of the U. S. Census. This census, of course, predated the adoption of the stock
 law anywhere in either county.
 95 In the 1880 census, 5 percent of the tenants and 18 percent of the farm owners in
 Carroll County reported having pasture. In Jackson County, the proportions were 15
 percent and 34 percent, respectively. Ninety-seven to 98 percent of the landowners in the
 two counties reported having pasture, forest, or unimproved land on their places,
 compared to 22 percent of the Carroll County tenants and 60 percent of those inJackson
 County. Nearly every landowner in both counties reported owning at least one non-draft
 animal, as did 89 percent of the tenants in Jackson County and 96 percent in Carroll
 County. Three conclusions may be drawn. First, especially in Carroll County, large
 numbers of tenants must have loosed their animals on the land of their landlords or on
 that of neighbors; for these people, the imposition of the stock law posed at least short-
 term difficulties. Second, nearly all landowners had some available unimproved land
 where if water was available, stock could be pastured. Third, even before the stock law,
 some farmers-a third of the owners inJackson County-did fence in their animals, despite
 the lack of a law requiring it; for them, the stock law was a pure benefit.
 96 Since holdings of animals were listed only in the agricultural schedule of the U. S.
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 Contemporaries understood the logic of market competition well. Jack-
 son County's "Progress" asserted that the stock law would make both
 landowners and their tenants better off. "The income of tenants and wages
 of hirelings will be regulated by the profits of the land owners .... Renters
 now demand houses for their families, and why not demand, under the new
 law, pasturage for their stock with the same propriety? This they will do,
 and receive it at far less cost to the owner than is required to repair fences."
 Similarly, the Jefferson Jackson Herald editorialized: "It is pure fallacy to
 say that the laborer or tenant, or, as the demagogues have it, the poor man,
 will suffer by it. The man who will have the burden to bear will be the man
 who owns the land. He will be compelled to furnish pasturage for his
 tenants or not get them, and it is impossible for him to do without help."
 "Tenant" believed that "whoever furnishes the best pastures will certainly
 get the best tenants, as it is all bosh about the land-holder being more
 independent than the tenant, for what is his land worth to him without
 labor?" In Rockdale County, which was one of the fist to pass the stock
 law, the editor of the county newspaper observed that "landlords see who
 can arrange the best pastures to secure the best tenants."97
 This analysis is supported, rather than undermined, by the constant
 assertions from the fence-law side that the stock law would damage tenants.
 The reason that they showed unusual concern for the poor, even for the
 black poor, while they made less direct appeals to cattle raisers and farmers
 who lived in sparsely settled areas, we suggest, is that the interests of the
 latter two groups were much more obvious than those of tenants. Tenants
 received so much attention in the debate because they were the swing
 voters. The same logic, moreover, suggests that there was no widespread
 coercion of tenants by landlords to vote one way or another in these secret
 ballot elections: if tenants' votes could be easily won through pressure,
 census and since only landowners and tenants were listed in that schedule, it is impossible
 to determine exactly what percentage of wage laborers owned animals. If a laborer did
 own a cow or pig and if he kept the animal on the open range, he would experience a
 decrease in real income when the stock law was imposed because he would have had either
 to rent pasture and purchase feed or to sell the animal. Alternatively, a laborer who owned
 no animals was probably indifferent between the two laws, at least in the short run. If he
 expected to own stock eventually, then he might have favored the open range. (Since the
 average age of both white and black household heads who were wage laborers was less
 than that of cash renters and owners in both Carroll and Jackson Counties in 1880,
 laborers may have expected to move up the agricultural ladder as they aged.) However,
 since improved acreage would have increased and fences for pastures needed to be built
 if the stock law were enacted, the short-term demand for wage labor might have increased
 in that case, causing upward pressure on wages. Overall, in the long run, the competitive
 market for labor should have equalized the wage of laborers in stock-law areas with that
 of those in nearby open-range lands, less moving costs.
 97 Jefferson Jackson Herald, June 24, 1881 ("Progress" quotation), June 10, 1881
 (second quotation), September 25,1885 ("Tenant" quotation); and unidentified Rockdale
 County newspaper, quoted ibid., August 24, 1883. Similarly, see A. R. Burch, in Newnan
 HeraldJune 30, 1881;J. B. McDaniel of Henry County, in Carrollton Carroll County Times,
 August 4, 1882; andJeffersonJackson Herald, October 31, 1884, and August 31, 1885.
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 why bother appealing to their intellects?
 Some renters, such as future Populist I. H. P. Beck announced, "I am
 going to vote for 'no fence' because I think it will be to my interest to do so
 and every other renter," while other debaters disagreed.98 Thus, an anony-
 mous writer in Carroll County declared that the stock law
 is ultimately going to be the ruin of the people and most especially the poor
 people that have no where to keep their stock. They are entirely dependent upon
 the land owners for pasture for which he will charge them more than double
 what their milk and cow is worth.... There is not one man out of ten that will
 let them have pasture room free of rent.... It is time now for the poor people
 to open their eyes and to come forward and stand up for their rights and not
 allow themselves to be led by the cunning land owners any longer and to come
 out and say that we want a fence and turn out en masse and carry the election
 for a fence ....99
 Landowner "L. F. L." asked, "How many of us Carroll people have lands to
 spare for pasture. How many of you colored and renters are able to pay Mr.
 A. or C. two or three dollars a month to keep your cow in his pasture, and
 pay your rent."'?? Lindsay J. Jones of Snake's Creek, who as a member of
 the Democratic county executive committee in 1892 fought against the
 Populists, put the rhetoric most picturesquely: "I want to say to the voters of
 Carroll county, that we as poor men, and negroes, do not need the [stock]
 law, but we need a democratic government and independence, that will do
 the common people good. If the rich men wants to put their stock up in pens
 all right."101 Or, as one tenant farmer bluntly observed, "This [stock] law
 will simply take rights away from the poor man and give them to the
 rich."102
 The material conditions of some fence-law supporters lent a discordant
 note to their apparently radical appeals to lower-class interests. John Stogner
 owned a farm worth two thousand dollars, nearly four times that of the
 average farm in Carroll County in 1880. Although he reported no perma-
 nent pasture to census officials, Stogner did possess thirteen cows and
 cattle, fifteen swine, and forty sheep, and he planted ten acres of cotton and
 twenty-five of corn. During the 1880s, he had a sufficiently large herd that
 he drove them to Atlanta to market.'03 But to listen to his rhetoric, he was a
 98 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 15, 1885. For a similar statement, see H. N.
 Timmons, ibid., June 19, 1885.
 "Ibid., June 19, 1885.
 100 Ibid., April 24, 1885. Most reports of similar arguments come from stock-law
 proponents who state them and then attempt to refute them. See, e.g., Jefferson Forest
 News, May 14, 1880;JeffersonJackson Herald, June 10, 1881, August 24, 1883, August 2,
 31, 1885, and February 26 and March 5, 1886; Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 1, 1885;
 and Charlotte (N.C.) Democrat, quoted in Southern Cultivator, XXXIV (May 1876),178-79.
 101 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 15, 1885. ForJones's membership on the county
 executive committee, see ibid., April 8, 1892.
 102 Quoted in Flynn, White Land, Black Labor, 131.
 103 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 20, 1887.
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 representative of another class. He condemned the stock law as "the
 greatest curse upon the poor laborer that has been since the civil war. We
 were told in 1859 that secession was the greatest thing that the South could
 do, so it was to lead her into destruction. It was a rich mans war and a poor
 mans fight, so will the stock law be a benefit to a few landlords who have
 plenty of water on their lands while nine tenths of the people will be in a
 deplorable condition." If the stock law passed, according to Stogner, "the
 common laborer will be the ones that will be the sufferers ... and why
 should we try [to] oppress this class any worse. God makes the grass[,] the
 mountaines crown, and corn in valleys grow, so lets not try to deprive our
 poor neighbors from receiving his blessing... ." Abner Nixon, whose
 farm was worth one thousand dollars and who valued his livestock at the
 not inconsiderable sum of two hundred dollars, added a historical note to
 predictions of the law's effect: "The stock law will divide the people of this
 county into classes similar to the patricians and plebians of ancient Rome,
 which unhappy division, was the source of much contention, injustice,
 violence and blood shed, and finally the overthrow of the republic, the
 kingdom and the empire, and brought on the dark ages of the world."(04
 Some stock-law supporters lent credence to the class oppression charges
 of their critics. Although he himself held no land, "6L." contended that "6the
 non land holding class have no tight to vote on this subject."')05 Favoring a
 property qualification for every election and accusing a fence-law propo-
 nent of being pro-black, 6L." thought it 66sensible ... to allow the landholders
 to say, whether they shall fence their lands or not.... Well do I know, to
 my sorrow, that the negroes and one fourth of the whites have been allowed
 the privilege of going to the ballot box! That is what is the matter with the
 country today!"''06 One bizarre proposal even aimed to disfranchise land-
 owners who had not erected fences around their land.'07
 While disavowing support for black suffrage, fence-law proponents
 condemned these disfranchisement proposals. Philo H. Chandler, a Demo-
 cratic party leader from the Kansas district of Carroll County during the
 1880s and 1890s who later became a stock-law supporter, denounced "such
 a law to prohibit any one from voting [as] wickedness in the eye of the law,
 and the eye of God." Moves to disfranchise all blacks or propertyless
 whites, he wrote, "are tyrannical and we are opposed to them from the fact
 that we live in an independent government by the people."''08 "Mill Boy"
 104 Ibid., June 26, 1885.
 105 Carrollton Carroll County Times, May 3, 1878.
 106 Ibid., June 7, 1878. For similar comments, see Thomas P. Janes, Annual Report of
 Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Georgia for the Year 1875 (Atlanta, 1876), 66; and
 Proceedings of the Georgia State Agricultural Society, 1876 to 1878, pp. 419-22. In 1891 the
 Georgia state legislature considered and overwhelmingly rejected a bill to disfranchise
 non-landowners in stock-law elections. See Carrollton Carroll Free Press, August 7, 1891.
 107 Carrollton Carroll County Times, May 3 and June 7, 1878; and Jefferson Jackson
 Herald, April 3, 1885.
 108 Carrollton Carroll County Times, May 17 (first quotation) and June 21 (second
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 responded to the proposition of "L." by asserting that "if he can scratch out
 that clause in the constitution that entitles them [blacks] to vote, I dont
 suppose that there are many Mill Boys that would cry about it. But sir, for
 God's sake dont disfranchise a white man, just because he is poor."'log
 Proponents of the stock law, disturbed by the actual or potential appeal
 of their critics' argument that tenants would be hurt by abandoning free
 grazing, convinced the state legislature to amend state law. After 1881, in
 subcounty militia districts where the stock law was voted into effect, but
 not in whole counties, landlords were legally required to furnish tenants
 with sufficient pasture to accommodate one cow and one calf, provided that
 the tenant shared the work of fencing. " l0 Contemporary debaters were well
 aware of this legal guarantee. When "Ripples" cited it before a countywide
 election, "Con" wrote in the next week, pointing out that it applied only to
 arrangements adopted in district referenda."'
 Thus, each side fought for the tenants' support in the usual ways of
 political campaigners, raising fears on the one hand and seeking to allay
 them on the other. Had tenants' interests been more obvious, there would
 not have been such a loud debate, and they would have voted more
 overwhelmingly for the fence law than they in fact did, as we show below.
 Landowners, tenants, and laborers were not the only socioeconomic
 categories that were relevant to the fence-law controversy. Twenty-one
 percent of the household heads in the two counties in 1880 were African
 Americans. In the context of southern political campaigns in the 1880s, the
 fence-law controversy generated relatively little race-baiting. Since nearly
 everyone expected blacks to vote overwhelmingly against the stock law, it
 is surprising that there were as few charges as there were that fence-law
 supporters wished "to array ignorant negroes against intelligent white
 people.""2 Instead, those who favored the stock law often asserted that
 blacks, as well as many whites, did not properly understand their own
 interests. "The negroes," said S. B. Orr, for example, "oppose it through
 prejudice and ignorance. "1 3 Whatever traditional yeoman community there
 was in the upcountry, blacks did not fit into it comfortably, and both sides
 quotation), 1878. Chandler converted to the stock-law side by 1882. For this switch and
 his later Democratic party leadership, see ibid., July 7 and August 18, 1882, andJune 6,
 1884; and Carrollton Carroll Free Press, July 8, 1892.
 109 Carrollton Carroll County Times, May 17 andJune 21 (quotation), 1878.
 110 Ga. Acts ... 1880-81, No. 401, pp. 79-81. This provision increased the proportion
 of tenants who could be expected to benefit from the imposition of the stock law from 47
 to 80 in Carroll County, and from 30 to 71 in Jackson County. For details of these
 calculations, see Kantor, "Razorbacks," 877-78.
 "I Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 1 and 8, 1882.
 112 See, e.g., Jefferson Jackson Herald, June 10 and 24, 1881, and October 31, 1884;
 Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 1, 1882; and Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May
 1, 1885 (quotation).
 "3 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, May 22, 1885. Similarly, see Newnan Herald,
 July 7, 1881.
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 appealed to them largely in their economic roles as tenants and wage
 laborers, rather than as African Americans per se.114 It was another sign of
 the economic, rather than cultural, nature of the homespun debate.
 Hahn treats the residents of small towns as merely commercial interests,
 neglecting the fact that their gardens and noses had much to gain from
 controls on stray pigs and cows.I"5 While to a twentieth-century suburban-
 ite the issue may be merely symbolic, to a nineteenth-century villager it
 may well have been primarily olfactory. Although they made up only 13
 percent of the household heads in 1880, before the completion of the major
 railroads that served the two counties, townspeople provided a core of
 support for the stock law."6 In 1886 Carrollton imposed the stock law by
 town ordinance."17 In the 1881 election in Jackson County, the two most
 "urban" of the county's eleven precincts provided 48 percent of the
 countywide vote in favor of the stock law."I8
 To test the Flynn/Hahn two-class model against more complex alterna-
 tives, we focus on the five countywide referenda on the stock law held in
 Carroll County from 1881 to 1890-in January 1882, September 1882,
 July 1885, July 1887, and July 1890-and the two held in Jackson County
 in July 1881 and September 1883.119 In addition, we use information from
 local option elections in many of the militia districts, which were sporadi-
 cally and incompletely reported in the newspapers. We pay particular
 attention to changes in the voting patterns over time.
 Although the fence side consistently attracted a majority of those casting
 ballots in both counties, there are two important trends in the data, only the
 first of which has been stressed by previous historians (see Table 2). The
 fence law gradually lost support throughout the 1880s. As the time-series of
 turnout figures demonstrates, however, this decline was overshadowed by
 the dramatic decrease in participation on both sides of the issue.120 The
 more numerous elections in Carroll County most clearly show the rise and
 fall of the fence debate's fury. An increase in voter turnout by almost 17
 percentage points between January and September 1882 is certainly an
 l"4JeffersonJackson HeraldJune 10, 1881, and August 24, 1883; and Carrollton Carroll
 Free Press, April 24 and May 15, 1885.
 115 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 256-57.
 116 Thirteen percent of household heads told census takers that they resided within
 town limits. The proportion of people living in civil divisions that contained towns was
 much larger. In 1890, for instance, 43.2 percent of Carroll County's population lived in
 the civil divisions that contained Carrollton, Villa Rica, and Temple. The proportion of
 townspeople by this measure in Jackson County was only about half as large as that in
 Carroll.
 117 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, March 26, 1886.
 118 JeffersonJackson Herald, July 8, 1881.
 119 Complete returns are reported in Kantor, "Property Rights and the Dynamics of
 Institutional Change: The Closing of the Georgia Open Range, 1870-1900" (Ph.D. diss.,
 California Institute of Technology, 1991), 92-94.
 120 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 266-67, notes the decline in participation but does
 not emphasize that it was nearly equal on both sides of the fence.
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 TABLE 2
 TRENDS N VOTING AND TuRNouT N STOCK-LAW REFERENDA
 N CARROLL AND JACKSON COuNTES, GEORGIA, 188 1-1890
 % of Votes Turnout in %
 for Stock Law ofAdult Males
 Carroll County
 January 1882 27.7 62.3
 September 1882 28.9 79.2
 July 1885 33.3 59.9
 July 1887 35.7 50.2
 July 1890 38.6 19.1
 Jackson County
 July 1881 25.7 54.5
 September 1883 32.7 57.5
 SOURCES: Carroilton (Ga.) Carroll County Times, January 13 and September 15, 1882;
 Carrollton (Ga.) Carroll Free Press, July 3, 1885, July 8, 1887, and July 4, 1890; and
 Jefferson (Ga.) Jackson Herald, July 8, 1881, and September 14, 1883.
 indication of the intense competition between the fence- and stock-law
 factions. As the editor of the Carrollton Carroll County Times remarked
 after the second ballot in his county: "No election for a long time in Carroll
 has excited more interest than the election last Saturday on the fence
 question. Exciting the interest it did, of course there was a full vote polled-
 larger, we believe, than any we have had in a long time."''2' By 1885 the
 intensity on both sides began to wane-almost twenty percentage points
 fewer eligible voters cast ballots-and the stock law gained marginally at
 the polls as a result of the diminished interest. By 1890 turnout in the stock-
 law referendum fell to only 19 percent. If Populism was, among other
 things, an outgrowth of the fence-law struggle, it seems counterintuitive
 that the temperature of the controversy cooled as the 1890s approached.
 While proponents of the stock law were able to increase their relative
 share of the electorate over time, their base of support in Carroll County
 was quite unstable. Table 3 displays the transition matrices between the
 fist and second elections in Carroll and Jackson Counties, and between the
 second and third elections in Carroll.' 22The transition matrices contain
 121 Carrollton Carroll County Times, September 15, 1882.
 122 Since the number of districts in Carroll County was small and since the relationships
 between the pre- and post-1885 elections were very nonlinear, violating the assumptions
 necessary to estimate transition matrices, we confine our analysis here to the elections
 through 1885.
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 TABLE 3
 TRANSITION MATRICES
 JACKSON AND CARROLL COUNTIES, GEORGIA
 Panel A: Carroll County, January-September 1882 Elections
 SEPTEMBER
 % Fence % Stock % Abstain Mean
 % Fence 0.920 0.052 0.028 0.496
 JANUARY % Stock 0.036 0.671 0.293 0.135
 % Abstain 0.286 0.196 0.518 0.369
 Mean 0.603 0.197 0.200
 Panel B: Carroll County, September 1882-July 1885 Elections
 JULY 1885
 % Fence % Stock % Abstain Mean
 % Fence 0.764 0.034 0.202 0.603
 SEPTEMBER % Stock 0.015 0.500 0.485 0.197
 1882 % Abstain 0.178 0.590 0.233 0.200
 Mean 0.430 0.181 0.390
 Panel C: Jackson County, 1881 to 1883 Elections
 1883
 % Fence % Stock % Abstain Mean
 % Fence 0.660 0.023 0.317 0.400
 1881 % Stock 0.002 0.994 0.004 0.139
 % Abstain 0.283 0.107 0.610 0.461
 Mean 0.383 0.181 0.436
 estimates of the probability that voters who supported one side in one
 election continued supporting that position, switched to the other side, or
 abstained from voting in a subsequent contest.'23 While an estimated 92
 percent of the fence-law voters in Carroll's first election in January 1882
 voted for the status quo again in September of that year, only 67 percent of
 the stock-law voters continued their support in September. Moreover, of
 those who voted for the stock law in January, 29 percent simply did not vote
 the second time. This is surprising, since the interval between the two
 elections was so short and since overall turnout rose by 17 percentage
 points from the first to the second contest. It is interesting to note that
 123 Because some estimates calculated by ordinary least squares fell outside the logical 0-
 100 percent bounds, we have estimated the equations underlying these tables in logit form.
 For a discussion of the use of the logit transformation in ecological regression, seeJ. Morgan
 Kousser, "Making Separate Equal: Integration of Black and White School Funds in Kentucky,"
 Journal of Interdisciplinaty Histoty, X (Winter 1980), 399-428. For details of the estimation
 procedures in this paper, see Kantor, "Property Rights," 86-88 n61.
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 almost 29 percent of the nonvoters in the first election supported the fence
 law in the second election, while about 20 percent of the newly mobilized
 cast their franchises for the stock-law position.
 Panel B of Table 3, which contains estimates of behavioral continuity
 and change in Carroll County from the September 1882 election to the one
 in July 1885, shows an even greater pattern of volatility, especially on the
 stock-law side. Of those who voted for the new institution in September
 1882, only half remained faithful through the next election, and almost half
 abstained. Stock-law proponents attracted 59 percent of those who had not
 voted in 1882; otherwise, the stock law's showing in 1885 would certainly
 have been even more meager. Conversely, the fence-law faction was able
 to maintain approximately three-fourths of its support over this period, with
 most of the remainder abstaining in the later election. In sum, Carroll
 County's stock-law coalition did not vote with the vigor that we would
 expect from a self-conscious class of "merchants, big landlords, and other
 commercial interests" out to impose a new economic order with themselves
 in social and economic control. Moreover, the interests of fence-law
 supporters were apparently either so obvious that they did not need an
 organization to succeed or, contrary to Hahn's claim, they were able to
 "develop an organizational apparatus to mobilize their ranks and inspire
 confidence in their numerical strength."124
 Panel C of Table 3 shows that Jackson County's stock-law coalition was
 extremely cohesive between 1881 and 1883. The fence-law side retained
 two-thirds of its backers over the same period and gained about 28 percent
 of those who had abstained at first. Although the stock-law group was able
 to hold its support in Jackson County through 1883, the law's proponents
 were continuously overpowered by the numerical strength of the fence-law
 advocates. Carroll County's stock-law voters, by contrast, were too fickle
 and too few to prevail at the county level.'25
 Frustrated by their repeated countywide defeats, stock-law supporters
 began to concentrate their attention on adopting the law at the militia-
 district level. By the 1887 countywide election in Carroll, eight of the
 fifteen districts had adopted the stock law in district referenda. In four of
 these eight districts, however, the fence law had originally been declared
 the victor, but after being contested on the ground of ballot fraud, the
 Carroll County Ordinary (judge) overturned the results and declared the
 124 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 256 (first quotation) and 267 (second quotation).
 Note that Carroll County stock-law supporters did not shift or drop out before 1883 as a
 result of district election victories, because, as far as we know from the newspapers, there
 were no district-only stock-law referenda in the county before 1884.
 125 "F-tests" for the "null" hypothesis that there was no statistical relationship between
 voting in each pair of elections yield values of 12.9, 6.0, and 15.0 for panels A, B, and C,
 respectively, which means that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the .01 level in every
 instance. "R-squares" for the logit equations in each panel are 0.691 for panel A, 0.512 for
 panel B, and 0.779 for panel C. All are reasonably good fits.
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 districts stock-law areas.126 The precise wording of the law, no doubt,
 confused the voters: the county election ballots were required to read either
 "fence" or "no fence," the latter meaning the stock law. The district election
 ballots, however, had to be either "for fence" or for the "stock law." The
 election in Carroll's Bowdon district was particularly muddled: the pre-
 cinct managers certified the result in favor of the fence law 102 to 73;
 however, the actual vote cast was 73 for "stock law," 68 "for fence," 30 for
 "fence," 2 for "a fence," and 2 for "the fence." The Carroll County
 Ordinary, after hearing arguments from both sides, threw out 33 votes not
 cast "for fence," thus leaving a majority of 3 votes for the stock law. 127 In
 the remaining four districts, however, the stock law won unequivocal
 majorities.
 Thus, by taking advantage of legal changes and ambiguities and by
 concentrating their attention on the much smaller districts, stock-law sup-
 porters were able to close the open range of Carroll and Jackson Counties
 little by little. The election rules were designed by the legislature to allow
 stock-law supporters to prevail in the areas that mattered most to them,
 those closest to either their farms or town property.'28 Once a district was
 recorded as voting for the stock law, that decision could not be reversed. As
 more and more districts jumped the fence, the area of open range and,
 therefore, its value to any stock owner in fence-law territory declined.
 Since more than half of Carroll County's districts were already under the
 stock-law rule by July 1887, it is not surprising that only about half of the
 eligible voters cast ballots in that month's countywide stock-law election.
 Within the next three years, five more districts imposed the stock law, and
 turnout in the 1890 contest plummeted to 19 percent. The decrease was
 126 It is difficult to consider SamuelJ. Brown, the Carroll County Ordinary in 1887, an
 agent of capitalism or one of the "agrarian bourgeoisie." In 1880 the only man named S.
 J. Brown in the county lived in Carrollton but owned a twenty-acre farm worth $500, of
 which he tilled thirteen acres. He apparently kept his one horse, one cow, one other head
 of cattle, and seven pigs in a one-acre pasture; or perhaps to prevent overgrazing on his
 own land, he allowed some of them to run at large. According to our measure of
 prospective gains and losses if the stock law were adopted, which we explain below, Brown
 would have gained the small sum of $40.74 if the stock law had been adopted in 1880. In
 the 1894 tax records, he is listed as owning fifty acres valued at $200 in the Bowdon district
 but no town or paper assets. His total wealth was reported to be $325. By comparison, the
 average wealth of the thirty-four members of the Populist county executive committee in
 that year was $635, and that of the fifty-three members of the Democratic county executive
 committee was $1,754. See Kantor, "Property Rights," 280. Even allowing for a possible
 understatement of his resources, it does not seem that Brown was a rich man.
 127 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, March 18 and 25, 1887.
 128 The success of planters and townspeople in convincing the legislature to change the
 rules on stock-law voting in 1881 contrasts dramatically with the apparent inability of the
 largest capitalist interest in the state, the railroads, to craft the stock-law rules in their
 favor. Since animals who wandered onto the tracks slowed trains and caused lawsuits,
 railroads, which by the 1880s stretched throughout the state, had a considerable stake in
 imposing the stock law statewide. If capitalistic interests increasingly dominated the
 state's politics, as Hahn implies, one would expect that railroads would have had more
 influence in the stock-law controversy than they did.
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 TABLE 4
 WERE STOCK-LAW SUPPORTERS CULTURAL IMPERIALISTS?
 TURNOUT AND SUPPORT FOR THE FENCE LAW IN CARROLL COUNTY, GEORGIA,
 REFERENDA, 1882-1890
 Election Date When District Adopted Stock Law for Itself
 Before 1887 1887-1890 After 1890
 Panel A: Turnout in Percentage of Eligible Voters
 January 1882 County 59.9 64.3 73.9
 September 1882 County 75.0 87.1 88.7
 1885 County 57.4 63.8 69.0
 District 61.5
 1887 County 41.6 65.2 71.2
 District 61.3
 1890 County 12.9 23.8 55.8
 District 72.3
 Panel B: Percentage in Favor of Fence Law*
 January 1882 County 37.7 56.4 67.3
 September 1882 County 47.9 70.6 79.0
 1885 County 59.4 78.5 81.9
 District 47.8
 1887 County 55.7 71.8 81.9
 District 51.9
 1890 County 46.4 69.7 78.8
 District 50.9
 NOTE: * These are the original returns, some of which were thrown out by the Carroll County
 Ordinary. Some districts voted more than once.
 most dramatic in the stock-law districts.'29 Table 4 shows Carroll County's
 voter turnout and election results for three types of districts: those that
 adopted the stock law by the 1887 countywide election, those that adopted
 after the 1887 election but before the 1890 contest, and finally, those
 districts that did not adopt the law until after 1890. The table tracks voter
 activity from 1882 to 1890, including district referenda, where the returns
 were available. What is apparent from Panel A of Table 4 is that once
 districts adopted the stock law, many voters apparently felt that the costs of
 casting a ballot for either option were too high to justify a trip to the polls. 130
 129 See Carrollton Carroll Free Press, July 18, 1890; and Bonner, Georgia's Last Frontier,
 143.
 '30 See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957), Chap. 14,
 for a discussion of calculations on the question of whether or not to vote.
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 The first group of districts sent 75 percent of their eligible voters to the
 polls in September 1882. In the 1885 countywide and district referenda and
 in later elections after these districts adopted the stock law, turnout de-
 clined, falling to 41.6 percent in 1887 and to a low of 12.9 percent in 1890.
 The second set of districts followed the same general pattern, with turnout
 in excess of 60 percent in January and September 1882, 1885, 1887, and in
 their district elections but only 23.8 percent in the 1890 countywide ballot.
 In regions where the open range continued to be argued actively, however,
 voters continued to go to the polls in large numbers. Of the voters who lived
 in districts that retained the open range through the 1890 election, 55.8
 percent went to the polls in the last countywide election, and 72.3 percent in
 referenda in their own districts-in striking contrast to the 12.9 and 23.8
 percent turnout in the districts that had already adopted the stock law for
 themselves. And as Panel B of Table 4 shows, the open-range districts
 voted faithfully for the fence law in county referenda throughout the
 election process.
 Tables 3 and 4 mar Hahn's image of helpless partisans of common rights
 overwhelmed by a juggernaut of merchants and rich farmers who repre-
 sented the impersonal free market.'3' Fence-law partisans won all seven
 countywide elections in the two counties from 1881 to 1890; and their
 pattern of support was, on the whole, much less volatile than that of their
 opponents. Even more serious for Hahn's thesis, after gaining the adoption
 of their preferred arrangement in their own districts, most stock-law sup-
 porters abstained in subsequent countywide referenda, rather than seeking
 to impose their views on open-range areas. This is not a conclusion that
 depends on even the very simple statistical analysis of election returns
 presented in Table 4, for contemporaries repeatedly commented on the
 issue. For instance, the pro-stock law Carrollton Carroll Free Press agreed
 with a correspondent who thought it "wrong for the county to pass on the
 question as to whether they should have the stock law in his district as the
 policy has been heretofore to let the districts act upon this matter for
 themselves." The proper policy, the editor wrote, was to "let each district
 work out its own salvation, but don't force it on a district whether they are
 willing or not."'32 Another correspondent, from a district that voted in favor
 of imposing the stock law on itself in May 1890 but against requiring it for
 the whole county little more than a month later, declared, "We got it by
 district election and we did not believe it was right to force it on those
 districts who did not have a majority to get themselves."'33
 On the same day in 1890 that Carroll County stock-law supporters
 abstained in droves, the same voters decided another issue in a local
 31 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 262 and 267.
 132 Carrollton Carroll Free Press, June 27, 1890.
 '33Ibid., July 18, 1890.
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 referendum. Bitterly contested for years, the proposal to issue bonds to
 erect a new county courthouse attracted 1,432 ballots in districts that had
 adopted the stock law. But strikingly, only 650 of the same voters who had
 already assumed the cost of going to the polls in the two-issue election
 bothered to express their opinions on the countywide fence question. In
 those districts where the stock law was not yet in force, however, there were
 204 ballots on the bond question and 210 on the stock law. 14 This special
 "allegiance to local control" displayed in the 1890 election is a clear
 indication that fence reformers were not engaged in any sweeping plan to
 restructure the social or cultural basis of their economy.135 Their goal,
 instead, was to restructure property rights in specific local geographic areas
 where economic efficiencies could be captured through a redefinition of the
 tort liability regarding animals and fences.
 If the analysis of changes in the overall vote totals partially alters the
 nature of the conflict as depicted by previous historians, it does not uncover
 the socioeconomic coalitions on each side, and it casts only a limited light
 on voters' motives. Did men vote for the fence law in order to voice their
 objections to the encroaching capitalist market and preserve a traditional
 community of rough equals, as Hahn contends? Did the fence-law conflict,
 as both Flynn and Hahn assert, divide this agricultural society into two
 distinct classes? Or, do the voting patterns suggest a more complex pattern
 of divisions, as our economic self-interest model implies?
 The rich data available allows us to address these questions in more than
 one way. Let us first consider the order in which the militia districts in
 Carroll County adopted the stock law. If the self-interest thesis is correct,
 then those districts in which farmers should have expected to gain the most
 from the imposition of the stock law should have adopted it first, while
 those in which more fanners benefited monetarily from the fence law
 should have dragged their collective feet. Using our 100 percent sample of
 the 1880 agricultural census manuscript returns, we have constructed a
 measure of the extent of the savings or losses for each district in the two
 counties if the stock law had been put into force instantaneously in that
 year.'36 We then calculated Spearman's Rho, a rank-order correlation
 ' Ibid., July 4, 1890. As their correspondent "Martin" of Smithfield noted after the
 1890 election, "We got it [the stock law] by district election and we did not believe it was
 right to force it on those districts who did not have a majority to get themselves. So our
 motto was fence and no bonds." Ibid, July 18, 1890.
 135 Quotation from Bonner, Georgia's Last Frontier, 143.
 36 To approximate the expected savings or loss, we estimated the amount of land
 wasted by fence rows within each district and calculated the value of crops that could have
 been grown on that land, less the cost of growing them. Next, we assigned livestock to
 available pasturage that existed before the institutional change and estimated a feed
 allowance for those animals that were previously unenclosed and that would now have to
 be put behind fences. We subtracted the value of this feed from the net profit of the
 aforementioned crops. Since farmers would need to maintain fewer fences under the
 closed-range policy, we calculated the approximate cost of replacing broken fences
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 TABLE 5
 DEFINITIONS, MEANS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES
 FOR MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
 Variable Name Variable Definition Mean Standard Deviation
 Dependent Variables
 Fence Percent of eligible voters 42.4 18.5
 for fence law
 Stock Percent of eligible voters 16.0 9.0
 for stock law
 Abstain Percent of eligible voters 41.6 18.5




 Forest Percent of farm acreage 58.7 11.0
 in forest
 Savings Percent of farms 34.5 11.5
 estimated to save money
 with the stock law
 CLAss-coNiFucr THEsis
 Tenants Percent of household 23.6 12.7
 heads sharecroppers or
 renters
 Laborers Percent of household 21.3 14.6
 heads farm laborers
 Land Value White land value divided 396.92 102.29
 by white voters
 coefficient, to determine whether the order of adoption of the stock law was
 similar to that on our measure of savings. It was. Counting all the districts,
 the correlation is 0.56, which is statistically significant at the conventional 5
 percent confidence level. Excluding those districts where the County Ordi-
 around crops and that around animals and added the difference between the two to the
 savings measure. Additionally, we assumed that farmers would bear a one-time cost of
 erecting new fences around their newly created pastures if the stock law were passed. As
 is usual in such economic indexes, our net savings measure represents the discounted net
 present value of these savings over an infinite time horizon. Following Roger L. Ransom
 and Richard Sutch, One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation
 (Cambridge, Eng., and other cities, 1977), 208, we assumed an interest rate of 7 percent.
 For details of the calculation, see Kantor, "Property Rights," 127-28 and 295-302.
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 TABLE 5 Continued
 COMMUNr AND
 SOCIAL-CONTROL Tuisis
 Gini Gini coefficient for value 045 0.07
 of owner-operated farms
 Stkinfrc Dummy variable that
 equals 1 if the district had
 adopted the stock law be-
 fore the referendum, and
 TowN THEsIs 0 otherwise
 Town Percent of household 5.0 9.1
 heads reporting town
 residence
 SOURCES: For voting returns, see Table 2. Data on wealth and unadjusted number of polls were
 collected from the Carroll and Jackson Counties Tax Digests (Georgia Department of Archives
 and History, Atlanta). All of the data were collected from manuscript population and agricultural
 census returns.
 nary overturned the initially announced results, the correlation is 0.79,
 which is significant at the 1 percent level. While these results do not prove
 that the self-interest model is correct, they clearly lend support to it.
 We also performed an ordinary least squares multiple regression analy-
 sis using county referendum returns as dependent variables and
 socioeconomic variables as independent variables.137 Because theoretical
 notions (ours among them) are often rather vague and because it is rarely
 obvious just how to operationalize a concept, we estimated equations with
 several different combinations of variables. Table S delineates the variables
 that we think give the most accurate and fair test of the various hypotheses
 offered by Hahn, Flynn, King, and ourselves."3' To determine the support
 137 The fact, pointed out earlier, that the number of ballots in the courthouse
 referendum was so much larger than that in the stock-law referendum in Carroll County
 in 1890justifies our decision to estimate the regression equations given in Table 5 in three
 separate equations, rather than by a two-stage procedure. On the fence question in
 Carroll County, it is obvious that men did not first decide whether or not to vote on the
 fence-law question, and then which way to vote. Instead, the two decisions were made
 simultaneously. We also estimated similar equations with logit models. Since the results
 paralleled those using ordinary least squares regression, we discuss the simpler models.
 Tests to determine whether it was appropriate to consolidate all the elections in both
 counties were also performed. When included in equations like those in Table 5, dummy
 variables that treated the counties and elections separately change the results in only one
 respect: in the non-pooled equations, the coefficients on the laborers variable are never
 significant. This does not change our overall interpretation at all. We did not add militia-
 district to countywide-referendum returns because, as we have argued at length in the
 text, very different considerations moved the voters in the two types of elections.
 I" Nearly all the different specifications of the model supported the interpretation
 advanced in the text. For instance, in Table 6, substituting the percentage of farms
 tenanted in each district for the percentage of tenants among household heads changes
 neither a sign of any coefficient nor the identities of the variables that are statistically
 significant at the conventional .05 level. Furthermore, supplanting the percentage
 residing in towns with the value of town real estate per capita or the percentage of forest
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 for the fence- and stock-law positions among all potential voters in the
 seven countywide referenda in the two counties, we divided the number of
 votes for each side in each militia district by the estimated number of polls
 in each district.139
 Although the definitions of most of the independent variables are self-
 evident, the rationale for each needs explanation. Two or perhaps three
 variables tap somewhat different facets of self-interest among farmers. The
 more unimproved forest land each district had, the more wood was avail-
 able for fences, and the more room animals had to roam without intruding
 on crop land or garden plots. Consequently, the district's voters should
 have been less enthusiastic about the stock law than in more developed
 areas. Similarly, the higher the proportion of farmers who, according to our
 calculations, should have expected to save money as a result of the passage
 of the stock law and the lower the proportion of farmers who should have
 expected to lose money, the greater should have been support for the
 change.
 A third variable, the value of white-owned farm real estate from the tax
 digest divided by the number of white male voters in each district, partly
 indexes self-interest and partly indicates class conflict.140 Those who owned
 either land convenient to railroad stations and markets or notably fertile
 land, which was most suitable for growing crops and therefore most
 vulnerable to the depredations of animals, had the largest material interest
 in overthrowing the fence law. Conversely, those who lived in districts
 where the fannland was less valuable, and therefore relatively more suit-
 able for livestock and less fit for crops, had a good deal to lose from the
 land with the percentage of tilled land does not change any signs or significance levels.
 Only sets of independent variables that are highly interrelated give appreciably different
 results than those in Table 6. Because it is always difficult to interpret the parameters of
 strongly collinear independent variables, we employ a set of variables that captured
 different facets of each explanation. It is, of course, possible that we err in our
 operationalization of hypotheses. If so, our explicit and exact formulation of them may
 stimulate productive debate if others propose and test alternative empirical models. As
 has been widely noted, two of the chief virtues of quantitative social scientific history are
 the clarity that it forces and its tendency to channel debate towards questions and
 techniques that allow definitive answers.
 139 We adjusted the number of polls reported in the county tax digests upward for each
 district because a comparison of data from the tax rolls with the 1880 manuscript census
 numbers of males over 21 in each county indicated that the tax assessors, who were
 supposed to assess even the propertyless, missed about 45 percent of the black and 23
 percent of the white male household heads in Carroll County and 30 percent of the black
 and 19 percent of the white male household heads inJackson County. Since the published
 1890 census does not give the number of males over 21 by minor civil division and the
 manuscripts for that census burned, we were forced to use the tax digest number of polls
 for each district for each election year, and we had to inflate every district's number of
 polls by the percentages for the whole county, given above.
 140 Because, as Table 1 above shows, only about 5 percent of black household heads in
 the two counties owned farms (and their farms probably had disproportionately low
 values), we excluded blacks from the numerator and denominator of this statistic.
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 stock law, at least in the short term. Nonetheless, because this variable also
 scales farmers and townspeople into the relatively rich and the relatively
 poor, it is also an indication of class conflict and fits into part of the
 hypotheses of Bonner, Flynn, and Hahn. We have therefore assigned it a
 position in Tables 5 and 6 under the "class-conflict thesis."
 Four variables express other aspects of the Hahn and/or Flynn models.
 Both authors hold that tenants and laborers should have feared the specter
 of social control that the stock law raised, as well as the material loss of free
 pasturage for their cows and pigs. Hahn believes that the "democratic
 commonwealth of producers" was strongest where wealth was most evenly
 distributed: "The districts lending the stock law its substantial support
 tended to have the closest links to market centers, the highest real-estate
 assessments and per capita wealth, and the greatest concentrations of land
 held by large landowners. It was here that merchants, big landlords, and
 other commercial interests wielded most influence and authority. Poorer,
 rural districts having more evenly distributed landholdings, on the other
 hand, rejected the law overwhelmingly and at times almost unanimously.
 Here small farmers feeling the new strains of staple agriculture had their
 firmest cultural foothold."'141 Although Hahn offers no systematic evidence
 for this proposition, we tested it by calculating a Gini index of inequality of
 landholdings among owner-operators in each district.'42 The higher the
 index, the more skewed the distribution and, according to Hahn, the greater
 should have been the support for the stock law. Finally, if the fence-law
 controversy was a "central feature" of an "increasingly withering attack" by
 elites on "common rights," as Hahn contends, then one should expect the
 attempt to foster social control not only to persist but, if anything, also to
 gain impetus after a district-level victory. 143 To capture this idea, we created
 a "dummy" variable, that is, a variable that takes on the values of only zero
 and one. Calling this variable stkinfrc (for "stock law in force"), we set it at
 one for districts that had already adopted the stock law by the time of the
 relevant county referendum and at zero otherwise. If Hahn is correct, the
 denizens of stock-law districts should have tried to force their practices on
 others.
 The last variable, the percentage of household heads in each district
 living within town limits, stands for different notions for Bonner and Hahn
 than it does for us. The earlier historians saw the towns as outposts of
 capitalism or progress and change, and as opponents of traditional prac-
 tices. While we largely agree with that description, we stress that
 townspeople, having less forest or common land and fewer animals than
 141 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 262 and 256.
 42 On the Gini index, see Satya R. Chakravarty, Ethical Social IndexNumbers (Berlin and
 New York, 1990), 50.
 143 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 243.
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 rural Georgians, stood to lose little by the closing of the range and that they
 probably viewed other people's animals as nuisances. According to either
 hypothesis, town-dominated districts should have opposed the fence law. If
 Hahn is correct and the bourgeois were aggressively trying to expand the
 sphere of market relations, then they should have continued to do so even
 after their own districts accepted the stock law. The choice between the two
 interpretations of townsmen's behavior, then, lies not in the patterns of
 relationships of the town variable, but in those of stkinfrc.
 Table 6 largely buttresses our contentions. Those voters who stood to
 lose money if the stock law passed voted against it, while those who stood
 to gain voted for it, holding other variables constant. Both coefficients of
 the savings variable are statistically significant. The positive and statisti-
 cally significant relationship between the savings variable and nonvoting
 implies that prospective beneficiaries sought to maximize only their own
 interest, which could be done without imposing the stock-law regime on the
 whole county. Since the extent of unimproved land is partially taken into
 account in estimating expected savings, as well as in land values, it is not
 wholly surprising that the percentage of land listed in the census as forested
 has no statistically significant relationship with the votes. The coefficient
 for the forest variable in the fence-law equation is, however, in the pre-
 dicted direction. Together, these variables alone explain 16 percent of the
 variance in the percentage for the fence law. If the land value variable is
 considered as a measure of self-interest, the three variables account for 17
 percent of the variance in the vote for the fence law and 28 percent in that
 for the stock law.'"4 As Hahn observes but does not sufficiently emphasize,
 "simple economic interest played a large role" in fence-law conflicts.'45
 If the value of farm real estate per voter is considered an indication of
 class conflict, then it implies that those in richer areas were more likely to
 participate in stock-law elections, all other things being equal, and were
 somewhat more likely to vote for the stock law than for the fence law. The
 data suggests that there was a palpable division between the white land-rich
 and the white land-poor over the fence law.
 Yet a simple two-class conflict model poorly fits the data from Carroll
 and Jackson Counties because group interests did not divide neatly into two
 parts. As our analysis of the competitive market for labor implied, tenants
 and laborers seem to have been largely indifferent between the fence and
 stock laws. In fact, the coefficients for the relationships between the
 percentages of tenants and laborers and voting on the issue have the
 opposite signs to those that the fence-law proponents' rhetoric suggested,
 144 These percentages of variance explained derive from equations containing an
 intercept term and the variables savings andforest, in the first instance, and savings,forest,
 and land value in the second.
 145 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 268.
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 TABLE 6
 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SEVEN COUNTY REFERENDA ON STOCK
 LAW IN CARROLL AND JACKSON COUNTIES, GEORGIA
 Independent Variables Dependent Variables
 Percent Fence Percent Stock Percent Not Voting
 SELF-INTEREST THESIS
 Forest 0.22 0.00 -0.22
 Savings -0.44* 0.16* 0.29*
 CLAss-coNFLicr THEsIs
 Tenants 0.43 0.17 0.26
 Laborers -0.56* 0.04 0.52*
 Land Value 0.0009 0.030* -0Q039*
 Commful`Y AND
 SOCIAL-CONTROL THEsis
 Gini 0.24 -0.33* 0.09
 Stkinfrc -28.17* -4.84* 33.01*
 TowN THEsis
 Town -0.48* 0.36* 0.11
 INTF.cEvrC 59.73* 7.75 32.5 1*
 NUMBER OF
 OBSERVATIONS 92 92 92
 R-SQUARE 0.54 0.43 0.54
 NOTE: * - statistically significant at 0.05 level.
 SOURCE: See Table 5.
 and the coefficient for the laborers was statistically significant at the
 conventional 5 percent level. Instead of turning out solidly for the fence law
 or the stock law, tenants and laborers appear to have abstained from
 votig.n6
 The regression results strongly disconfium Hahn's cultural-conflict model.
 All other things being equal, the greater the equality of landholdings in a
 district, the stronger, not the weaker, the support for the stock law, and the
 coefficient is statistically significant.'47 That is, controlling for other fac-
 146 Because African Americans in these two counties were overwhelmingly but not
 entirely farm laborers, entering the percentage of blacks in each district separately into
 the equation leads to problems of multicollinearity. Since blacks were addressed in the
 debate largely in their economic, rather than racial roles, we chose to use the laborer
 rather than the black variable; but an equation substituting the black percentage for the
 farm laborer percentage produces very similar results. It is conceivable that blacks were
 coerced to stay away from the polls, but there was no mention of this occurring in either
 county. Since the Carrollton Carroll Free Press did discuss charges that Coweta County
 blacks had been encouraged to go to a state fair by stock-law supporters who feared that
 blacks would vote for the fence-law side, it seems likely that any such event, in Carroll
 County at least, would have been noticed in the newspaper. See Carrollton Carroll Free
 Press, July 16 and 23, 1886.
 47 If the coefficient of variation (that is, the standard deviation divided by the mean)
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 tots, areas peopled by relatively undifferentiated yeomen, the sorts of
 places where, according to Hahn, "preindustrial republicanism" thrived,
 were especially likely to favor fencing in animals."'4 And, as the simpler
 analysis of the voting already presented showed, those who lived in areas
 where the stock law had been put into effect through district elections did
 not seek to impose it on other parts of Carroll County. Instead, they largely
 abstained in the referenda, as did fence-law supporters in the same districts.
 Neither group acted as if motivated by a desire to thrust its value system on
 people in other areas or to protect a threatened communitarianism against
 hostile forces. Rather, they seem to have been responsive to their own
 rather narrowly drawn self-interest.
 Finally, as the earlier analysis of votes also showed, and as the hypoth-
 eses of every historian who has examined the question predicted, townsmen
 strongly supported the stock law and opposed the fence law. Whether they
 did so to foist market relations on yeomen or to keep hogs and cattle from
 running loose in the towns is a matter of interpretation, but, as the above
 analysis of the stkinftc variable suggests, the latter is the preferable interpre-
 tation.
 The fence-law struggle in Carroll and Jackson Counties, the centerpiece
 of one of the most striking and influential recent interpretations of postbellum
 southern society, Steven Hahn's Roots of Southern Populism, does not
 represent, as he contends it does, an epic struggle between the aggressive
 agents of capitalism and the increasingly hapless defenders of a traditional
 communitarian ideology or "moral economy." The astonishingly sophisticat-
 ed debate on the subject, which anticipated many of the notions of modern
 economists, primarily concerned practical issues-costs, profits, conserva-
 tion, and demographic change.149 Those who appealed rhetorically to
 for each district is substituted for the Gini coefficient, the results are almost exactly the
 same. The correlation between the two measures of inequality for this set of data is +0.9 1.
 '48 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 253. It turns out that in these counties, the districts
 containing villages had more equitably distributed landholdings than did those in the
 most rural areas. This suggests that the notion of an undifferentiated yeomanry in the
 outlying areas should be reexamined.
 149 We saw no evidence that newspaper editors, who were always anxious to feature
 controversy in order to build circulation, censored the fence-law side of the debate.
 Indeed, the editor of theJefferson Forest News, T. S. Howard, declared (ibid., September
 19, 1879) that "we cannot tell whether this measure [the stock law] would be beneficial
 or not, especially at this time. And, as we are in no condition to form a correct opinion
 upon the subject, we refrain from giving any, but offer our columns for a fair discussion
 of the question, and would like to see it ventilated, for we think no harm can be done in
 a fair and honest discussion of the benefits or evils that will arise from this measure. We
 shall stand as impartial judges in the matter, and promise that both sides shall have a fair
 showing. We want our correspondents, to start off with, to give us the opinions of their
 respective communities upon the subject." In fact, the debate on both sides was
 remarkably full and the number of articles on the subject was quite large. In any case, local
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 "traditional rights," as well as those who apostrophised "progress," often
 mixed these invocations with practical, calculating arguments in their
 letters to newspapers. The persuasive tactics of both sides reflected the late
 nineteenth-century upcountry society's consensus on private property and
 individualism. Each side devoted many words to what tenants and laborers
 should have expected to gain or lose from the change because in a competi-
 tive labor market, it was doubtful that this question of tort liability made
 much difference to the landless in the long run.
 The results of both simple and more complicated statistical analyses
 support our interpretation of the debates and undermine Hahn's cultural-
 conflict theory. Stock-law proponents did take advantage of the 1881
 legislature's district-option law to win gradually at the militia-district level
 what they could not pass in countywide referenda in either Carroll or
 Jackson Counties.150 Having achieved their aim in subcounty districts in
 Carroll County, stock-law advocates made little or no effort to shackle
 unwilling backers of the open range in other parts of the county. Voters in
 districts where the objective economic benefits of the stock law were high
 were quite likely to adopt the new institutional arrangement sooner than
 those where the benefits were lower or negative. Areas where landholding
 was most equitably distributed, the supposed bastions of yeoman indepen-
 dence, actually were more likely to support the stock law than were less
 egalitarian districts, all other things being equal. Townspeople, as Bonner,
 Flynn, and Hahn all agree, favored fencing in animals, not crops, but their
 reasons were, we have argued, more practical than ideological. If these two
 counties were representative of the upland South in the late nineteenth
 newspaper stories constitute the best extant source for the policy debate, and all
 historians who have studied the issue have been forced to rely on them.
 150 InJackson County, six of the thirteen districts adopted the stock law before 1890,
 but instead of holding a countywide referendum, advocates convinced the legislature to
 impose the stock law on the county in a special act, which was later declared unconstitu-
 tional. GeorgiaActs ... 1889, No.788, pp. 1278-79; Mathis v.Jones, 84 Ga. 804 (1890); and
 Camp v. Tompkins, 84 Ga. 812 (1890). It was eventually reimposed through still another
 legislative enactment. Georgia Acts ... 1890-91, No. 12, p. 69, amended in Georgia Acts,
 1892-93, No. 44, pp. 104-5. The lack of a local referendum after districts began to act in
 Jackson County makes it much more difficult to determine the forces behind the change
 there than in Carroll County. Hahn's statement in The Roots of Southern Populism, 265, that
 the districts that imposed the stock law on themselves inJackson County consisted of the
 towns of Jefferson and Harmony Grove "along with three of the wealthier districts" is
 misleading. (In fact, there were four other districts that adopted the stock law in district
 referenda, along withJefferson and Harmony Grove-Harrisburg, Clarkesboro, Newtown,
 and Hoschton.) See JeffersonJackson Herald, October 23, 1885, and September 2 and
 November 11, 1887. Using total wealth per capita (the same index that Hahn uses) from
 the 1887 tax digest as a measure of wealth and excluding the two wealthy town districts,
 the other four districts that adopted the stock law in district referenda ranked 1, 3, 5, and
 7, while the districts that did not adopt the stock law before 1890 ranked 2, 4, 6, and 8-
 11. The correlation is hardly overwhelming.
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 century, as Hahn implicitly claims, then the fence-law controversy in the
 upcountry was a struggle not of cultures but of interests.15'
 151 Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 9-10.
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